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The gender gap in over-indebtedness 
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Abstract – We document a significant gender gap in over-indebt-
edness, as we find women to be less likely to become over-indebted 
even after controlling for risk attitude, financial literacy and socio-
demographic characteristics. However, once we account for loan 
purposes the gender gap diminishes. Our findings highlight the im-
portance to account for loan purposes when analyzing individuals’ 
debt behavior. 
 
Keywords: Gender, over-indebtedness, loan purpose, financial literacy, gender 
gap, consumer debt 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, individuals’ demand for uncollateralized debt, such 
as consumer loans, has increased considerably. For instance, in Germany, individ-
uals carry €207 billion in uncollateralized debt (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017) and 
the number of over-indebted individuals increased four years in a row to approxi-
mately 6.9 million households in 2017 (Creditreform, 2017). Excessively accumulat-
ing uncollateralized debt bears substantial consequences, such as the risk of bank-
ruptcy, credit constraints, or even the exclusion from the credit market (e.g., 
Gathergood, 2012; Lusardi and de Bassa Scheresberg, 2013). Next to these econom-
ical aspects, high amounts of debt and perceived stress caused by holding debt have 
been shown to affect physical health (Drentea and Lavrakas, 2000), psychological 
distress (Brown, Taylor, and Wheatley Price, 2005), and depression (Bridges and 
Disney, 2010). 
Using data from a large representative survey conducted by the German Central 
Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), we acknowledge the manifold negative consequences 
of over-indebtedness and analyze the determinants that cause individuals to become 
over-indebted on uncollateralized debt. The novelty of our study is that we partic-
ularly investigate the relationships of gender, loan purposes, and over-indebtedness 
jointly.1 
However, why should gender and loan purposes be associated with individuals’ 
over-indebtedness? Research reveals that women are more risk averse when con-
ducting financing decisions (Almenberg and Dreber, 2015; Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek, 1998; Powell and Ansic, 1997). For example, women have been found to 
feel less comfortable with debt (Almenberg et al., 2018) and to find debt less useful 
                                      
1 We focus on uncollateralized debt (i.e., consumer loans, credit card loans, and overdraft facilities), be-
cause they are readily available and of high cost, compared to collateralized loans (e.g., mortgage loans). 
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compared to men (Haultain, Kemp, and Chernyshenko, 2010). Hence, we hypothe-
size that women might be less likely to become over-indebted, because they might 
more carefully consider the decision to take on a loan and for what purpose. 
Similarly, there is an extensive literature concerning individuals’ indebtedness, 
with evidence suggesting that economic, demographic, and psychological attitudes 
shape individuals’ subjective attitudes towards debt, which in turn affects individ-
uals’ decision to take on debt (e.g., Lea et al., 1993, 1995). In our study, we use 
loan purposes as an objective measure of individuals’ attitudes towards debt, and 
assess their relationship to individuals’ likelihood to become over-indebted. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, despite women and men 
show similar likelihoods to take on debt and face virtually the same debt burdens, 
we find women to be less likely to become over-indebted. Interestingly, this gender 
gap in over-indebtedness persists even after controlling for a number of factors that 
have been previously identified to explain other gender gaps (e.g., stock market 
participation, retirement planning, or credit card usage), including risk attitude, 
financial literacy and individuals’ socio-demographics (e.g., Almenberg and Dreber, 
2015; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Mottola, 2013). Second, once we control for indi-
viduals’ loan purposes, which we find to be strongly related to over-indebtedness, 
the gender effect becomes insignificant. This finding reveals that loan purposes ac-
count for a significant part of the gender gap in over-indebtedness. We further 
elaborate on this finding and investigate whether women engage in debt for other 
purposes than men. Our results provide some evidence that women are less likely 
to engage in debt to cover cost of living or to finance larger consumption driven 
purchases. Those loans have been found to be related to self-control issues, which 
in turn might increase individuals’ propensity to become over-indebted (Gathergood, 
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2012). In that, our results might provide support for the notion that women more 
carefully consider for which purpose they take on a loan. 
In general, our results highlight the importance to control for loan purposes 
when analyzing individuals’ debt behavior, especially in the context of gender dif-
ferences, as we document that loan purposes explain a significant part of the gender 
gap in over-indebtedness. 
2. Material and methods 
To assess whether gender and loan purposes affect over-indebtedness on uncol-
lateralized debt, we use representative survey data from the 2011 Panel on House-
hold Finances (PHF), which has been conducted by the German Central Bank 
(Deutsche Bundesbank) and covers responses of 3,565 individuals. The PHF com-
prises in-depth information on individuals’ financial assets, and individuals’ debt, 
as well as socio-demographic and psychological characteristics. Moreover, respond-
ents’ were asked for what purpose they took out their loans. Respondents took out 
their loans for at least one of the following eight purposes: real estate (7.8%), vehicle 
(19.4%), company or occupation (1.8%), debt conversion (6.0%), student loans 
(1.2%), cover cost of living (24.7%), other purposes specified (5.8%) or no specific 
purpose specified (44.3%).2 For each of the eight different loan purposes, we build 
an indicator variable, that equals one if a respondent reports that she took out the 
loan for the respective purpose, zero otherwise. 
For our dependent variable, we follow Gathergood (2012) and measure individ-
uals’ over-indebtedness as self-reported credit repayment struggles. In this regard, 
we classify individuals as being over-indebted if they got into arrears on debt within 
                                      
2 Because individuals can have more than one loan, individuals may report multiple loan purposes. 
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the past 12 months. Our measure of over-indebtedness provides two major ad-
vantages in contrast to other debt measures, such as debt-to-income ratios, as it 
combines the strengths of being an objective measure while simultaneously being 
unbiased by an individual’s current life-cycle stage (Gathergood, 2012). To match 
over-indebtedness to uncollateralized loans, we restrict our sample to respondents 
that hold no other debt than uncollateralized debt, which comprises consumer loans, 
credit card debt and overdraft facilities (henceforth, indebted individuals). This 
restriction leads to a final sample of 649 indebted individuals of which approxi-
mately 7% report being over-indebted. 
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table I-1 shows descriptive statistics for all indebted individuals, distinguishing 
between indebted women and men.3 
 
Table I-1: Summary statistics of indebted individuals 
This table reports summary statistics of individuals that took out an uncollateralized loan (N = 649, thereof 318 women 
and 331 men). The data are weighted and representative for the German population. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively. 
 All Female Male Diff. N 
Female 0.49    649 
Financial literacy 2.34 2.38 2.29 0.09 634 
General trust 5.44 5.59 5.30 0.29 648 
Impatience 4.41 4.45 4.37 0.08 648 
Risk attitude 4.03 3.86 4.19 -0.33 648 
Age 44.28 43.16 45.37 -2.21 649 
Education 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.03 649 
Married 0.45 0.45 0.46 -0.01 649 
Divorced 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.06 649 
Self-employed 0.06 0.03 0.10 -0.07*** 649 
Retired 0.16 0.12 0.20 -0.08** 649 
Unemployed 0.08 0.06 0.11 -0.05* 649 
Net income 2,018 2,039 1,997 42 649 
Net wealth 61,368 63,550 59,244 4,306 649 
Amount of uncollateralized debt 9,287 10,544 8,063 2,480 649 
 
                                      
3 We provide detailed variable descriptions in Appendix I-1. 
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The sample is evenly divided between women (49%) and men (51%), indicating 
that women take on debt quite as often as men.4 Moreover, women face the same 
debt burdens and possess comparable repayment capabilities like men. The only 
exceptions where women differ from men are related to respondent’s employment 
status. In particular, indebted women are less likely to be self-employed, unem-
ployed or retired. Interestingly, indebted women achieve similar financial literacy 
scores compared to indebted men. This is somewhat surprising, as on population-
level, women have repeatedly been found to be less financially literate compared to 
men (Bannier and Neubert, 2016; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008).5 
3.2. Regression analysis 
3.2.1. Determinants of over-indebtedness 
In this section, we assess whether gender and loan purposes affect individuals’ 
likelihood to become over-indebted on uncollateralized debt. Table I-2 reports av-
erage marginal effects from a series of Probit regressions featuring over-indebtedness 
as the dependent variable. In column (1), we regress individuals’ over-indebtedness 
on gender (dummy for being female) without further control variables. The average 
marginal effect in column (1) reveals a significant gender gap in over-indebtedness 
as we find women to be approximately 7.3 percentage points less likely to become 
over-indebted. Next, in column (2), we add socio-demographics as well as measures 
for financial literacy and risk attitude as further controls to our regression model.  
  
                                      
4 A formal F-test equals 0.02 with a corresponding p-value of 0.88, indicating that women take on uncol-
lateralized debt quite as often as men. 
5 Please note that we also find women to be less financially literate on population-level. Descriptive statis-
tics on population-level are available upon request. 
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Table I-2: Determinants of over-indebtedness 
This table presents average marginal effects from a series of Probit regressions featuring over-indebtedness as the depend-
ent variable. In column (1), we regress over-indebtedness on Female. Next, in column (2), we further include control 
variables, including measures for financial literacy, risk attitude as well as a large set of socio-demographic variables. 
Finally, in column (3), we further add individuals’ reported loan purposes as control variables. For detailed variable 
descriptions, please refer to Appendix I-1. The data is weighted and representative for the German population. Tailor 
linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent: Over-indebtedness 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.0725** -0.0592** -0.0264 
 (0.0328) (0.0261) (0.0217) 
Financial literacy  -0.0328** -0.0303** 
  (0.0141) (0.0122) 
Risk attitude  0.0086 0.0057 
  (0.0055) (0.0046) 
Trust  -0.0127** -0.0107* 
  (0.0060) (0.0057) 
Impatience  0.0021 -0.0022 
  (0.0043) (0.0046) 
Age  0.0083 0.0053 
  (0.0071) (0.0058) 
Age2  -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education  0.0000 0.0037 
  (0.0203) (0.0201) 
Married  -0.0041 0.0093 
  (0.0272) (0.0218) 
Divorced  0.0677** 0.0616** 
  (0.0300) (0.0263) 
Self-employed  0.0027 -0.0291 
  (0.0405) (0.0441) 
Retired  0.0792* 0.0557 
  (0.0479) (0.0409) 
Unemployed  0.0014 0.0319 
  (0.0350) (0.0275) 
Net income (log)  -0.0580** -0.0660*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0232) 
Net wealth (log)  -0.0021* -0.0009 
  (0.0011) (0.0010) 
Amount of debt (log)  0.0309*** 0.0184* 
  (0.0107) (0.0097) 
Cost of living and larger purchases   0.1136*** 
   (0.0260) 
Real estate   0.1155*** 
   (0.0405) 
Company or occupation   0.1825*** 
   (0.0471) 
Student loans   0.0626 
   (0.0450) 
Vehicle   -0.0200 
   (0.0286) 
Debt conversion   0.0689** 
   (0.0333) 
Other purposes   -0.0233 
   (0.0333) 
Observations 649 633 633 
F-test 5.592 2.709 2.408 
F-test p-value 0.018 0.000 0.000 
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We proceed in this way, because studies have shown that especially financially 
illiterate individuals are more likely to become over-indebted (e.g., Gathergood, 
2012; Lusardi and Tufano, 2015). Since taking on debt can be associated with sig-
nificant risks, we further add respondents’ risk attitude as a control variable (Brown, 
Garino, and Taylor, 2013). Interestingly, results in column (2) show that, although 
the gender gap decreases in magnitude, it is still statistically significant, indicating 
that differences in socio-demographics as well as financial literacy and risk attitude 
fail to explain the gender gap in over-indebtedness.6 This result is in contrast to 
findings on the well-documented gender gap in stock market participation as out-
lined in Almenberg and Dreber (2015), who document that socio-demographics and 
financial literacy fully explain the gender gap in stock market participation. Finally, 
in column (3), we further include individuals’ loan purposes as explanatory varia-
bles. We document that the effect of gender on over-indebtedness sharply declines 
and becomes statistically insignificant once we control for the initial loan purposes. 
While our results suggest that student loans and loans for vehicles are not associ-
ated with over-indebtedness, loans for real estate, company or occupation, debt 
conversion, and to cover cost of living or to finance larger purchases turn out to be 
strongly positively related to over-indebtedness. With respect to student loans, this 
is reasonable, as, in contrast to the US, student loans are quite uncommon in Ger-
many and only of low amounts since German public universities do not raise tuition 
fees (Usher, 2005). The non-existing relationship between loans for vehicles and 
over-indebtedness is also not surprising, as interest rates for loans on vehicles are 
rather low. Some providers even offer zero percent financing. With regard to the 
                                      
6 Please note that this result remains robust when we exclude either self-employed, unemployed or retired 
individuals, indicating that the gender gap in over-indebtedness shown in column (2) of Table I-2 even persists 
after excluding potential confounding differences in socio-demographics as displayed in Table I-1. 
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positive relationship between loans for real estate and individuals’ over-indebted-
ness, we argue that using large amounts of uncollateralized debt for real estate 
purposes is of relatively high cost compared to using a collateralized mortgage loan 
(Disney and Gathergood, 2013). Loans for company or occupation, however, might 
also be related to over-indebtedness because they are often used to finance the 
formation of businesses, which clearly bear the risk of failure. A possible reason for 
the positive relationship between over-indebtedness and loans for debt conversion 
might be that individuals only engage in loans for debt conversion when they are 
already highly indebted. Lastly, the positive relationship between loans to cover 
the cost of living and larger purchases is in line with Gathergood (2012), who finds 
that taking on such loans is related to a lack of self-control and therefore to over-
indebtedness. 
3.2.1. Do women engage in debt for other purposes than men? 
In this section, we investigate why women show lower likelihoods of becoming 
over-indebted, although they face virtually the same debt burdens compared to 
men.7 Because studies provide some evidence that women show a more hesitant 
attitude towards debt, they might more carefully consider for which purpose they 
take on a loan and thus take on debt for other purposes than men. To test this 
assumption, in Table I-3, we regress the eight loan purposes presented in section 2 
on respondent’s gender and all control variables displayed Table I-1. 
  
                                      
7 Please see Table I-1. 
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Table I-3: Do women engage in debt for other purposes than men? 
This table presents average marginal effects from a series of Probit regressions featuring loan purposes as the dependent variables. 
In columns (1) to (8), we regress each different loan purpose on Female and all other control variables displayed in column (2) 
of Table I-2. For detailed variable descriptions, please refer to Appendix I-1. The data is weighted and representative for the 
German population. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Real 
estate Vehicle 
Company 
or 
occupation 
Debt 
conversion 
Student 
loans 
Cost of living 
and larger 
purchases 
Other 
purposes 
No 
purpose 
named 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Female 0.0295 0.0236 -0.0063 0.0057 -0.0092 -0.1225*** 0.0023 0.0497 
(0.0188) (0.0371) (0.0080) (0.0244) (0.0090) (0.0465) (0.0224) (0.0460) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 633 633 588 633 535 633 588 633 
F-test 4.142 3.802 4.033 2.633 2.770 2.848 0.846 6.595 
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.626 0.000 
 
At a first glance, results for most columns of Table I-3 reveal that loan purposes 
do not vary between genders. However, results in column (6) of Table I-3 suggest 
that women are approximately 12.3 percentage points less likely to engage in loans 
to cover cost of living or to finance larger consumption driven purchases. 
Gathergood (2012) shows that individuals engage in those loans due to a lack of 
self-control, which in turn is related to over-indebtedness. The finding that women 
refrain from engaging in loans to cover cost of living or to finance larger consump-
tion driven purchases thus supports the notion that women might more carefully 
consider for which purpose they take on a loan. 
4. Conclusion 
Research has acknowledged several gender gaps when it comes to financial de-
cision-making. Gender specific differences are found in, for example, stock market 
participation (Almenberg and Dreber, 2015), retirement planning (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2008), overtrading (Barber and Odean, 2001), comfort in taking debt 
(Almenberg et al., 2018), or credit card usage (Mottola, 2013). A great number of 
those gender gaps can be ascribed to women being (or feeling) less financially lit-
erate and less risk tolerant. 
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Our results document an economically and statistically significant gender gap 
with regard to individuals’ likelihood to become over-indebted. In particular, we 
show that women are less likely to become over-indebted, even after controlling for 
a large set of variables including socio-demographics as well as measures for finan-
cial literacy and risk attitude. This indicates that, unlike in other studies analyzing 
gender gaps in financial decision-making, the gender gap in over-indebtedness can-
not be explained by gender differences in financial literacy or risk attitude. We 
show that loan purposes are strongly related to over-indebtedness and explain a 
significant part of the gender gap in over-indebtedness. Moreover, despite women 
and men face virtually the same debt burdens, we find women to refrain from 
engaging in loans to cover cost of living or to finance larger purchases. Such loans, 
for example, for buying a new television, might often be for pleasure and due to a 
lack of self-control (Gathergood, 2012), which is why they seem to be related to 
over-indebtedness. However, there might also be considerable reasons to take on 
such loans, for example when the products are of urgent needs, such as replacing a 
broken washing machine. Unfortunately, our data does not provide information on 
the specific products for which respondents took out the respective loans. While 
this might present a limitation of our study, future studies should further investi-
gate whether women are less likely to engage in loans for products that are not of 
urgent needs. 
Our results highlight the importance to control for loan purposes when analyzing 
individuals’ debt behavior, especially in the context of gender differences, as we 
document that loan purposes explain a significant part of the gender gap in financ-
ing decisions. 
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6. Appendix 
Appendix I-1: Variable descriptions 
Panel A: Controls 
Age Ordinal variable that contains head of respondent’s age. 
Amount of uncol-
lateralized debt 
Continuous variable measuring respondents’ total outstanding uncollateralized debt, including 
credit card debt, overdraft facilities and consumer loans. 
Divorced Dummy variable that equals one if respondent is divorced, and zero otherwise. 
Education Ordinal variable that describes the respondent’s highest degree of education/qualification: 1- Higher 
education entrance; 2- non-academic post-secondary education; 3- University degree or higher. Zero 
otherwise. 
Financial literacy Ordinal variable measuring the number of correct answers to financial literacy questions. Corre-
sponding PHF items: 
Question 1: Compound interest effect: "Let us assume that you have a balance of 100 EUR on your 
savings account. This balance bears interest at a rate of 2% per year and you leave it for 5 years 
on this account. How high do you think your balance will be after 5 years?" 1-More than 102 EUR 
[correct]; 2-Exactly 102 EUR; 3-Less than 102 EUR. 
Question 2: Inflation: "Let us assume that your savings account bears interest at a rate of 1% per 
year and the rate of inflation is 2% per year. Do you think that in one year’s time the balance on 
your savings account will be the same as, more than, or less than today?" 1-More than today; 2-
The same as today; 3-Less than today [correct]. 
Question 3: Diversification: "Do you agree with the following statement: ‘Investing in shares of a 
company is less risky than investing in a fund containing shares of similar companies’?" 1-Agree; 
2-Disagree [correct]. 
Impatience 
Ordinal variable that measures respondents’ impatience on a scale from [0] - Very patient [10] - 
Very impatient. 
Male Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is male, and zero for female. 
Married Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is married, and zero otherwise. 
Net income Continuous variable measuring respondents’ monthly income (EUR). 
Net wealth Continuous variable measuring respondents’ net wealth (EUR). 
Over-indebtedness Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent reports that she got into arrears on uncollat-
eralized debt within the past 12 months, and zero otherwise. 
Retired Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is retired, and zero otherwise. 
Risk attitude Ordinal variable that measures respondents’ financial risk attitude on a scale from [0] - Highly risk-
averse [10] - Very happy to take risks. 
Self-employed Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is self-employed, and zero otherwise. 
Trust Ordinal variable capturing respondents’ general trust levels on a scale from [0] - I do not trust 
other at all, to [10] I trust others completely. 
Unemployed Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is unemployed, and zero otherwise. 
Panel B: Loan purposes 
Company or occu-
pation 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent took on uncollateralized debt for company or 
occupation, and zero otherwise. 
Cost of living and 
larger purchases 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondent took on uncollateralized debt to cover cost of living 
or to finance larger purchases, and zero otherwise. 
Debt conversion Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent took on uncollateralized debt for debt conversion 
of other loans, and zero otherwise. 
No purpose named Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent took on uncollateralized debt and did not ex-
plicitly named the purpose for which she took on the debt, and zero otherwise. 
Other purposes Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent took on uncollateralized debt for other reasons, 
and zero otherwise. 
Real estate Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent took on uncollateralized debt for real estate, 
and zero otherwise. 
Student loans Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent took on uncollateralized debt to finance a period 
of study, e.g., a student loan, and zero otherwise. 
Vehicle Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent took on uncollateralized debt to purchase a 
vehicle or any other mode of transport, and zero otherwise. 
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1. Introduction 
In our study, we exploit the availability of secured subsidized pension products 
in Germany that offer the downward protection feature of bank deposits while sim-
ultaneously providing higher upside potential than saving in bank deposits 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017; Institut für Vorsorge und Finanzplanung, 2016). 
Those products offer state subsidies, tax advantages and higher interest rates com-
pared to saving money in bank accounts.1 
However, we show that, on population level, more than a quarter of German 
households neither holds subsidized pension products nor other pension products, 
risky financial assets and saving loan contracts. For their old age savings, these 
households rely solely on contributions to their bank deposits, an “investment strat-
egy” that is associated with negative inflation-adjusted returns. The reluctance to 
invest in risky financial assets is a well-documented finding being explained by, for 
example, high levels of risk aversion or high participation costs associated with 
those products (e.g., Antoniou, Harris, and Zhang, 2015; Dimmock et al., 2016; 
Shum and Faig, 2006; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003). However, literature has not yet 
elaborated why households do not hold subsidized pension products that offer a 
reasonable and secure investment alternative to bank deposits, while offering an 
easy entry through small monthly contributions.  
Our study aims to close this gap by investigating the underlying determinants 
affecting households’ decision to engage in subsidized pension products. Subsidized 
pension contracts are fairly more complex and require a sufficient understanding of 
financial concepts. We argue that this complexity might serve as a potential expla-
nation why households do not engage in such pension products. In our study, we 
                                      
1 We provide detailed information on the subsidized pension products under review, as well as their func-
tioning in section 2.1.2. 
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investigate whether financial literacy and receiving financial advice is associated 
with a higher likelihood of holding those products. More precisely, we hypothesize 
that financially literate households are likely to face fewer problems when evaluat-
ing more complex financial products. Further, we hypothesize that financially lit-
erate households are more likely to be aware of the negative consequences of per-
sistently low interest rates and thus, seek for comparable safe products with higher 
expected returns than bank deposits. With regard to receiving financial advice, we 
hypothesize that financial advisors might provide households with valuable infor-
mation on financial products, raise awareness of the negative consequences of hold-
ing solely bank deposits, thereby guiding households to subsidized pension products 
as a reasonable investment alternative. 
To test whether financial literacy and financial advice are related to households’ 
propensity to engage in subsidized pension products, we use the Panel on Household 
Finances (PHF), a nationally representative German household survey provided by 
the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). 
We contribute to the literature and show that both financial literacy and finan-
cial advice are positively related to holding subsidized pension products. In that, 
our results point to the fact that financial literacy and receiving financial advice 
might help households to better understand the benefits of holding subsidized pen-
sion products. Our findings are robust to a variety of different alternative explana-
tions, including liquidity constraints, traumatic experiences due to the financial 
crisis, savings purpose, as well as households’ degree of indebtedness. Moreover, we 
perform a propensity score matching analysis to control for a potential selection 
bias of receiving financial advice. 
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Our study adds to two strands of economics and finance literature. First, our 
research is closely related to the literature investigating the effects of financial lit-
eracy on households’ financial decision-making. Prior studies have shown that fi-
nancially literate households are more likely to hold stocks (van Rooij, Lusardi, and 
Alessie, 2011), better diversified portfolios (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; Guiso 
and Jappelli, 2008), and to be more likely to plan for their retirement (Bucher-
Koenen and Lusardi, 2011; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2012). Further, studies 
have suggested that financially literate households possess the relevant knowledge 
to understand even more complex financial products, such as private pension plans 
(Börsch-Supan, Coppola, and Reil-Held, 2012; Bucher-Koenen, 2009). Our results 
provide some evidence in favor of the latter as we document that financially literate 
households are more likely to hold more complex subsidized pension products, prob-
ably because they are more likely to correctly assess the benefits associated with 
those products. 
Second, our study largely contributes to the mixed evidence on financial advi-
sor’s role for households’ financial decision-making. Although basically any product 
can be bought, and any investment can be made online nowadays, the literature 
has particularly emphasized that a large proportion of households consult financial 
advisors before purchasing financial products (e.g., Chater, Huck, and Inderst, 2010; 
Hung and Yoong, 2013; Investment Company Institute, 2007). According to Collins 
(2012), a financial advisor’s role is to provide customers with product-related infor-
mation and to defuse biases associated with common investment mistakes. In doing 
so, financial advisors are a strong determinant of households’ asset allocation deci-
sions (Foerster et al., 2017). However, on the downside, recent studies provide some 
evidence that portfolios of advised households underperform those of unadvised 
households (e.g., Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano, 2009). Further, studies reveal 
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that advisors can encourage households to chase past returns and to hold actively 
managed funds, which usually come up with higher management fees and front-up 
loads (Mullainathan, Noeth, and Shoar, 2012). On the upside, other studies show 
that financial advisors add value by increasing households’ portfolio diversification 
(Bluethgen et al., 2008) and participation in the stock market (Shum and Faig, 
2006). Moreover, in his seminal work, von Gaudecker (2015) shows that advised 
households achieve higher risk-adjusted returns. Our study provides some evidence 
that receiving financial advice seems to be beneficial for households’ financial deci-
sion-making, because we find that advised households are more likely to engage in 
subsidized pension products. In that, financial advisors might provide households 
with product-related information, thereby helping households to overcome a poten-
tial fear of investing in more complex financial products, such as subsidized pension 
products. 
2. Data and institutional framework 
2.1. Savings and investment behavior in Germany 
2.1.1. Risky and safe financial assets and non-subsidized pension products 
In our study, we draw on the Panel on Household Finances (PHF), which is a 
nationally representative survey covering more than 3,500 households conducted by 
the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) between September 2010 and 
July 2011 (von Kalckreuth et al., 2017).2 When conducting savings and investment 
decisions, households in our sample can choose from a wide array of different asset 
classes, including risky financial assets, bank deposits, saving loan contracts and 
both state-subsidized and non-subsidized pension products. Risky financial assets 
include any assets held in a securities account, namely, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, 
                                      
2 See von Kalckreuth et al. (2012) for further information on the data collection process of the PHF data. 
We apply survey weights in all of our main analyses to obtain representative results for the German population. 
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and other securities such as certificates. Likewise, households can rely on safe in-
vestment alternatives, such as bank deposits that include checking (incl. positive 
balances on credit cards) and savings accounts. While risky financial assets usually 
provide the chance to achieve positive inflation-adjusted returns, they also entail 
the risk of a total loss of invested capital, due to the investment being affected by 
market up- and downturns. In contrast, saving only in bank deposits can be con-
sidered as safe because, up to an amount of €100,000, they are protected by the 
German Deposit Guarantee Act. However, on the downside, interests on households’ 
bank deposits have steadily declined during the last years. Figure II-1 shows the 
sharp decline in effective interest rates on households’ bank deposits with an agreed 
maturity of under 3 months (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2019).3 
 
Figure II-1: Effective interest rates on households’ bank deposits from 2003 to 2018 
 
 
 
This figure shows the effective interest rates on households’ bank deposits with an agreed maturity of under 3 
months provided by the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2019). 
 
                                      
3 Please note that the depicted interest rates are not inflation adjusted. If so, they would have been negative 
from the years 2010 on. 
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German households can also rely on saving loan contracts as well as non-subsi-
dized pension products, including occupational pensions (if offered by an employer), 
non-subsidized life insurance policies and other non-subsidized pension plans. Alt-
hough those products guarantee the capital preservation of invested amounts, they 
also share the negative commonality with bank deposits in terms of unsatisfactory 
inflation-adjusted returns especially in the recent low-interest environment. More-
over, the products are often of rather high cost (e.g., distributional costs), thereby 
lowering the potentially higher interest rates compared to bank deposits. 
2.1.2. The case of subsidized pension products 
When conducting savings and investment decisions, households constantly face 
a tradeoff between risk and return. However, Germany as well as other European 
countries offer subsidized pension products that provide a reasonable and downward 
protected investment alternative to bank deposits simultaneously featuring profit-
able state subsidies. In particular, the German Retirement Saving Act of 2001 in-
troduced the so called “Riester” pension in order to strengthen the privately funded 
pillar of old-age provision in Germany.4 Those products are state-subsidized and 
intended to close the pension gap caused by the gradual decline in the relative 
performance of the statutory pension system (Börsch-Supan et al., 2016). Riester 
pension contracts of different types are closed with certified Riester providers such 
as banks or insurance companies. The most common type is the classic Riester 
pension insurance and amounts to 65.3% of all issued contracts (Bundesministerium 
für Arbeit und Soziales, 2019). Other, less popular types of Riester contracts are 
mutual fund Riester contracts (19.7%), as well as bank saving Riester contracts 
(4.1%). However, all types have in common that Riester savers regularly, usually 
                                      
4 For self-employed individuals, there are complementary products called Rürup pension products.  
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monthly, contribute a certain amount of money and eventually receive a lifelong 
annuity upon the beginning of the pension phase. To remain flexibility, the monthly 
payments might be increased, reduced, and/or paused, which of course affects the 
amount of the premiums correspondingly (e.g., Börsch-Supan et al., 2016). 
The subsidies associated with Riester pension products are particularly designed 
for households with a low income and households with children (Bucher-Koenen, 
2009). They can be differentiated in three parts. First, the owner of the Riester 
contract receives a personal subsidy. This subsidy is determined by the amount of 
the savings sum and comprises the regular contributions by the Riester contractor 
plus the subsidies. To receive the maximum personal subsidy of €1545, the savings 
sum has to equal 4% of the last years’ gross income, but at least €60 and not more 
than €2,100. The same applies for marital partners that might be indirectly eligible 
for Riester subsidies.6 The second part of Riester subsidies is represented by a child 
subsidy. In particular, Riester savers receive a subsidy of €300 per year for each 
child.7 Third, Riester savers, particularly with higher incomes, are able to reduce 
their taxable income (tax deduction) by the savings sum, whereby the potentially 
saved taxes are reduced by the granted subsidies.8  
In Figure II-2, we calculate subsidy quotas for various scenarios with respect to 
the Riester savers’ income, marital status and number of children living in house-
hold. For example, the yearly contribution to receive the maximum direct personal 
                                      
5 As of 2010, the time the survey took place. In the meantime, the maximum direct personal subsidy has 
been raised to €175 (2018). 
6 If a Riester saver’s partner has no income, he or she can engage in an own contract and pay the minimum 
contribution of €60 per year to receive the full direct personal subsidy of €154. 
7 Please note that in case of both marital partners having one Riester contract, the child subsidy is only 
granted once per child. 
8 Next to the just described components of Riester subsidies, there is also a starter bonus of €200 which is 
granted to job starters under the age of 25 years. 
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subsidy of €154 for a married Riester saver with an income of €20,000, one child 
born after 2008 and whose partner has no income, equals €800 (i.e., 4% of €20,000). 
 
Figure II-2: Subsidy quotas of subsidized Riester pension products (own calculations) 
 
 
 
This figure shows subsidy quotas for various scenarios, distinguishing between Riester savers’ income, marital 
status and number of children living in household. The subsidy quotas are calculated as the granted subsidies 
divided by the savings contribution, whereby the savings contribution is defined as the sum of subsidies and 
own contribution. We assume that the Riester contract is designed to receive the maximum subsidies, that 
children are born after 2008, and that in case of married couples, only one individual has an income. 
 
The marital partner, who has no income has to pay additional €60 in a separate 
Riester contract to receive another €154. In addition, the couple receives €300 for 
their child. Altogether, the couple has to pay €252 in order to receive €608 in 
subsidies, resulting in a subsidy quota of 70.7%.9 
Next to the subsidies, Riester savers profit from the investment of their savings. 
In case of the classic Riester pension insurance, the minimum nominal interest rate, 
                                      
9 The yearly contributions of the couple (€860) are deducted by the granted subsidies that are comprised 
of two times the direct personal subsidy of €154 (€308) as well as the child subsidy of €300, resulting in an 
effective contribution of €252 p.a. In this example, the couple cannot profit from the special tax deduction as 
the potential tax benefit of €148 is exceeded by the subsidies. We calculated the potential tax benefit using 
resources from the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2019). 
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which is paid on the savings sum (after costs) is guaranteed by law and equals 
2.25% p.a.10 For mutual fund Riester contracts, significant portions of the contri-
butions are invested in financial products (e.g., governmental bonds) with very low 
risk to ensure the payment of the minimum pension. The remainder will be invested 
in riskier products. Some mutual fund Riester contracts will not guarantee a certain 
interest rate but only the capital preservation of the savings sum (after costs), 
offering the opportunity to allocate a higher proportion to riskier products. 
In this regard, subsidized pension products in Germany substantially differ from 
those of other countries, such as 401(k) plans or IRAs in the US. Despite they also 
provide individuals with tax advantages, 401(k) plans and IRAs are far less secure 
as they do not guarantee the capital preservation. For instance, in cases of sharp 
decreases in investment value due to market downturns, individuals will not be 
refunded the amounts that they initially invested. In contrast, all types of Riester 
guarantee to refund the amount initially invested by individuals. Hence, while 401(k) 
plans or IRAs entail the risk of a total loss of invested capital, this risk does not 
apply to any type of Riester products under review. Altogether, with a few hundred 
euros savings a year, savings of ten thousands of euros can be accumulated, which 
underlines how saving in Riester pension products is preferable compared to saving 
in bank deposits. 
To illustrate the Riester contracts’ advantageousness compared to saving in 
bank deposits, we estimate internal rates of return for exemplary 30-year Riester 
contracts in Appendix II-3.11 Since Riester contracts are very heterogeneous in their 
designs and underlying investments, we restrict our analysis to the potential returns 
                                      
10 As of 2010, the time the PHF survey took place. In the meantime, the guaranteed interest rate for new 
contracts sunk to 1.75% (2012), 1.25% (2015) and 0.9% (2017). 
11 Note that we estimate the internal rates of return based on the amount of money in the Riester contract 
after 30 years. In reality, this money will be paid out as a pension and is not available as lump sum for the 
contractor. For further assumptions we had to make, please refer to Appendix II-3. 
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of the subsidies only and assume that the returns from the underlying investments 
do not exceed the costs of the contracts and are used to cover them. As a result, 
the returns from our exemplary (simulated) contracts do only stem from the subsi-
dies and are likely to be higher in reality. Appendix II-3 supports the notion in 
Bucher-Koenen (2009) and reveals how low-income households and households with 
children strongly profit from the subsidies. The internal rate of return for a married 
couple with two children and an income of €20,000 equals 9.97%. The lowest inter-
nal rate of return in our sample is received by a single household with no children 
and an income of €20,000 and amounts to 1.95%. However, as Figure II-1 shows, 
the average interest rate for savings in bank deposits in 2010 equaled 1.41% and 
decreased sharply since then. While the sharp decrease might not have been pre-
dictable for investors, the already comparably high ex-ante expected returns from 
the subsidies only indicate the Riester pension plans’ potential. 
2.1.3. Households’ actual savings behavior 
But how do households actually save and invest their money? 
 
Table II-1: Savings behavior in Germany (analysis sample) 
Sample  Amount of assets in €  
 N = 2,261          
Name %   Mean Median 
Std. 
dev N 
Risky Financial Assets 24.51%  34,304 10,000 116,316 715 
Funds 19.22%  21,521 8,000 38,265 516 
Stocks 11.54%  23,588 6,000 124,728 404 
Bonds 4.44%  29,073 10,000 103,206 167 
Other securities 2.31%  11,275 8,000 33,539 77 
Bank deposits 89.66%  15,972 5,000 37,772 2,066 
Checking accounts 79.92%  3,346 1,300 7,977 1,851 
Savings accounts 68.60%  16,979 5,600 39,746 1,640 
Saving loan contracts (excl. state-subsidized) 39.99%  7,772 3,800 13,236 931 
Pension products 71.15%  34,048 14,592 62,440 1,721 
State-subsidized pension products 36.84%  6,697 2,470 20,264 877 
Non-subsidized pension products 60.55%  35,934 15,500 62,711 1,524 
Total financial assets     52,462 20,800 112,568 2,181 
This table shows savings and investment behavior of German households (N = 2,261). Amounts of assets with positive 
values are conditional on owning the respective asset class. The data we use is weighted and draws on a subsample of the 
representative PHF survey. For a detailed variable description, we refer to Appendix II-2. 
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In Table II-1, we present the savings and investment behavior of German house-
holds. Throughout our analysis, we excluded retired households and those younger 
than 18 and older than 67 years, because already retired households are not eligible 
to close any new pension contracts.12 Table II-1 shows that German households 
possess total financial assets of €52,462 and 24.5% hold any risky financial assets. 
This result is in line with Bannier and Neubert (2016), who found approximately 
23.0% of German households to possess risky assets. Disaggregating risky financial 
assets, we find that 19.2 (11.5%) of German households hold mutual funds (stocks). 
Further, 4.4% possess bonds, and 2.3% engage in other securities, including certifi-
cates. Among the other financial assets, we document that 89.7% hold bank deposits 
and approximately 40.0% engage in saving loan contracts. Börsch-Supan, Coppola, 
and Reil-Held (2012) state that both nonsubsidized and subsidized private pension 
products play important roles in German households’ old-age provision. Our results 
support this notion, as we find that 71.2% of households under review possess at 
least one pension product.  
However, somewhat surprisingly, we document that only 36.8% engage in sub-
sidized pension products, whereas around 60.6% possess non-subsidized pension 
products. But why does a large fraction of households not engage in subsidized 
pension products? Do households that do not invest in subsidized pension products 
hold other financial assets providing sufficient returns, so that they simply do not 
have to use subsidized pension products? For a large fraction of households, the 
answer is worrisome – it seems they do not. In Figure II-3, we show that a large 
fraction of 15.4% of households only save in bank deposits, despite the availability 
of subsidized pension products providing a reasonable and downward protected 
                                      
12 For population-level summary statistics on the savings and investment behavior of German households, 
please refer to Appendix II-4. 
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investment alternative to bank deposits.13 We find that the fraction of households 
only saving in bank deposits is larger among households in the lower income brack-
ets. For instance, the fraction of households only saving in bank deposits among 
those with yearly net income up to €10,000 equals around 43.5%. This finding is 
particularly worrisome, because subsidized pension products are particularly de-
signed for low income groups, i.e., they receive the highest subsidy quotas and they 
only require very low amounts of regularly contributions.14 In light of the ongoing 
demographic changes leading to increases in the pension gap of future retirees rely-
ing solely on statutory pension system, we aim to assess factors affecting households’ 
decision to make use of subsidized pension products. 
 
Figure II-3: Fraction of households who only save using bank deposits across income brackets 
 
 
 
This figure shows the fraction of households who only save using bank deposits (i.e., not owning any financial 
assets other than bank deposits) across different income brackets. The data we use is weighted and draws on 
a subsample of the representative PHF survey. We provide detailed variable descriptions in Appendix II-1. 
 
  
                                      
13 Note that on population level (i.e., including retired households and those older than 18 and older than 
67 years), the fraction of households, who save only using bank deposits equals 25.8%, respectively. 
14 With regard to the highest income bracket (yearly net income above €90,000), we find an increase in 
the likelihood to save only in bank deposits. However, this effect might be driven by potential outliers because 
only 98 households in our sample belong to this group. 
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2.2. Sam
ple characteristics 
 
 
Table II-2: Summary statistics (analysis sample) 
 Sample 
    N Mean SD Min. 10th 25th Median 75th 90th Max. 
Financial literacy 2,228 2.560 0.688 0 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Financial advice 2,026 0.254 0.435 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Risk aversion 2,261 6.048 2.343 0 3 5 6 8 9 10 
Trust 2,258 5.445 2.105 0 3 4 5 7 8 10 
Male 2,261 0.516 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Married 2,261 0.512 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
No. of children living in household 2,261 0.658 0.971 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 
Age 2,261 42.247 11.57 19 26 33 43 51 58 67 
Education 2,261 0.620 0.859 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Self-employed 2,261 0.097 0.295 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Unemployed 2,261 0.077 0.267 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Household monthly net income 2,261 2,550 2,664 100 896 1,319 2,100 3,100 4,500 100,000 
Household net wealth 2,261 139,584 369,885 0 0 3,470 30,000 150,000 350,000 26,627,400 
Value of household’s main residence 2,261 88,062 158,374 0 0 0 0 150,000 270,000 3,600,000 
Outstanding mortgage debt 2,261 30,821 79,519 0 0 0 0 13,000 110,000 1,800,000 
Outstanding non-mortgage debt 2,261 4,276 15,541 0 0 0 0 3,000 10,000 362,000 
Homeowner 2,261 0.391 0.488 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Receiving of larger gifts or inheritances 2,261 0.278 0.448 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Save regularly 2,261 0.585 0.493 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
This table reports summary statistics of German households used in our analysis. Retired households and respondents younger than 18 as well as older than 67 are 
excluded from our analysis. The data we use is weighted and draws on a subsample of the representative PHF survey. We provide detailed variable descriptions in 
Appendix II-1. 
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Table II-2 reports summary statistics for the main explanatory variables used 
in our analysis.15 The average level of financial literacy in our sample equals 2.6, 
indicating that respondents on average correctly answered more than two out of 
three financial literacy questions first introduced in Lusardi and Mitchell (2008). 
This result corresponds well to Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer (2014), who used 
the same set of financial literacy questions regarding representative data from Ger-
man households and found that the average number of correctly answered financial 
literacy questions was 2.4.16 Of the households in our sample, 25.4% received in-
vestment advice by their house bank, while 74.6% reported that they did not con-
sult their financial advisor over the last two years. Furthermore, households in our 
sample are rather risk averse, with average risk aversion levels of 6.0 (scale from 0 
to 10 with higher values indicating higher risk aversion), and they exhibit trust 
levels of 5.4 as measured in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) on a scale from 0 
to 10 with lower values indicating greater distrust of people. With respect to house-
holds’ socio-demographics, 51.6% of the respondents are male and 51.2% are mar-
ried. The average respondent in our sample is 42 years old. Following Dick and 
Jaroszek (2015) or Meyll and Pauls (2018), education is measured as a categorical 
variable that denotes the level of respondents’ education from primary (0) to post-
tertiary (3). In terms of labor market status, 9.7% are self-employed, 7.7% report 
being unemployed. The average household earns monthly net income of €2,550, and 
their average net wealth measured as total wealth minus outstanding liabilities, 
equals €139,584. In our sample, 39.1% report being homeowners. Of the total wealth, 
households’ value of main residence accounts for approximately €88,062 euros with 
                                      
15 For population-level summary statistics of German households (i.e., including retired and younger and 
older households), please refer to Appendix II-5. 
16  Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer (2014) use representative SAVE (Sparen und Altersvorsorge in 
Deutschland) data from 2009. 
MEYLL et al.  Leaving money on the table 
 
II-35 
 
outstanding mortgage debt of €30,821. In terms of unsecured debt, households in 
our sample on average have outstanding non-mortgage debt of €4,276.17 Finally, 
27.8% of households report that they received larger gifts or inheritances and 58.5% 
of households report to regularly save a certain amount of their income each 
month.18 
 
Table II-3: Comparing demographic profiles of subsidized pension product owners vs. non-owners 
 SP owners Non-owners Diff.  t-Stat. N 
Financial literacy 2.669 2.498 0.171 4.18*** 2,228 
Financial advice 0.329 0.211 0.118 4.13*** 2,026 
Risk aversion 5.861 6.157 -0.297 2.07** 2,261 
Trust 5.610 5.349 0.261 1.99** 2,258 
Male 0.473 0.541 -0.068 2.21** 2,261 
Married 0.604 0.459 0.145 4.71*** 2,261 
No. of children living in household 1.006 0.454 0.552 9.33*** 2,261 
Age 40.654 43.177 -2.523 3.79*** 2,261 
Education 0.698 0.575 0.123 2.32** 2,261 
Self-employed 0.075 0.109 -0.033 2.09** 2,261 
Unemployed 0.048 0.094 -0.046 3.18*** 2,261 
Household monthly net income 2,985 2,297 688 4.70*** 2,261 
Household net wealth 168,066 122,968 45,098 2.67*** 2,261 
Homeowner 0.443 0.361 0.081 2.73*** 2,261 
Receiving of larger gifts or inheritances 0.318 0.254 0.064 2.29** 2,261 
Save regularly 0.687 0.525 0.162 5.47*** 2,261 
This table reports demographic profiles of respondents distinguishing between owners of subsidized pension products (SP 
owners) and non-owners, respectively. The data we use is weighted and draws on a subsample of the representative PHF 
survey. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Next, in Table II-3, we compare demographic profiles of households holding 
subsidized pension products (SP owners) and those who do not hold any subsidized 
pension products (non-owners). We also report the difference in means between the 
two groups and the corresponding significance levels as indicated by a t-test.19 
                                      
17 The total amount of outstanding non-mortgage debt includes outstanding balances of credit lines or 
overdrafts, outstanding balances of credit cards, and outstanding balances on all other non-collateralized loans 
(i.e., student loans, car loans, consumer loans, instalment loans, and private loans from relatives, friends and 
employers). 
18 Households were provided with a list of items to indicate in which form they received the large gift or 
inheritance. Please see Appendix II-1 for more details. 
19 In Appendix II-6, we further compare the fractions of households holding subsidized pension products 
among different demographic variables (e.g., fraction of SP owners in the groups of advised vs. unadvised 
households). 
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As already mentioned, Riester pension plans are particularly designed to benefit 
low-income households and households with children (Bucher-Koenen, 2009). With 
regard to marital status and the number of children, we find that SP owners are 
more frequently married and on average have more children. However with regard 
to households’ income, we find that SP owners actually have higher average incomes. 
Together with the findings from Figure II-3, it seems that just low-income house-
holds turn down subsidized pension plans, even though the products are particularly 
designed for them. Furthermore, we find that SP owners show higher levels of fi-
nancial literacy, are more likely to consult financial advisors and to have lower 
levels of risk aversion. SP owners also have higher levels of general trust, are less 
likely to be male and more likely to be married, compared to non-owners. In terms 
of education and labor market status, we document that SP owners have higher 
level of education, and they are less likely to be self-employed or unemployed. On 
average, SP owners have higher a higher wealth, compared to non-owners and they 
are more likely to be homeowners. Finally, we find that SP owners are more likely 
to report that they received any larger gifts or inheritances, as well as they are 
more likely to report to regularly save a certain amount of their income each month. 
3. Regression results 
3.1. Model 
To examine the relationships between financial literacy, financial advice and 
individuals’ holding of state-subsidized pension products, we estimate a series of 
specifications using the following Probit regression model: 
푆푃푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹퐿 + 훽2 ∗ 퐹퐴 + 훾′풄푖 + 훿′풂푖 + 휀푖    (1) 
where 푆푃푖 denotes an indicator variable that equals one for individuals holding 
state-subsidized pension products, 퐹퐿 is the financial literacy score measured on a 
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0-3 scale, and 퐹퐴 is an indicator variable that equals one for individuals that ob-
tained investment advice by their house bank during the last two years (i.e. advised 
individuals). The vector of control variables 풄푖 captures a large set of individual 
characteristics that have been previously identified in literature to affect savings 
and investment decisions, such as stock market participation. In particular, in vec-
tor 풄푖, we include a measure for individuals risk aversion (Dohmen et al., 2010), 
general trust (Guiso et al., 2008), as well a large set of socio-demographics including 
gender, marital status, number of children living in household, age groups, educa-
tional level, labor market status, household monthly income quartiles and net 
wealth quartiles.20 Furthermore, we assess whether the household is a homeowner, 
whether the household received any larger gifts or inheritances, and whether the 
household is regularly saving a certain amount each month. Finally, in vector 풂푖, 
we capture other financial assets held by the household by including the indicator 
variables that equal one if households report to hold risky financial assets, saving 
loan contracts, or non-subsidized pension products, respectively. To ensure the in-
terpretability of the results from our Probit regression model, we estimate average 
marginal effects. 
3.2. Main Results 
Table II-4 reports average marginal effects obtained from various specifications 
of the generic Probit regression model formalized in Equation (1). In specification 
(1) and (2), we report the unconditional effects of financial literacy and financial 
advice on holding subsidized pension products, and in specification (3), we jointly 
control for both main variables of interest. The average marginal effects reveal a 
statistically significant positive effect of both financial literacy and financial advice. 
More precisely, a one-unit increase in financial literacy is associated with a 8.8 
                                      
20 Please see section 2.2. and Appendix II-1 for a detailed definition of household net wealth.  
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percentage point increase in the propensity to hold subsidized pension products 
(specification (1)). Furthermore, results in specification (2) show that households 
that received investment advice by their main house bank during the last two years 
are 13.9 percentage points more likely to hold subsidized pension products. Specifi-
cation (3) reveals that both factors are still significant once we jointly control for 
them. In column (4) and (5) of Table II-4, we add the vector of control variables 
풄푖 and the vector of other financial assets held in portfolio 풂푖 to our regression 
model. While the average marginal effects of financial literacy and financial advice 
decrease in magnitude, the results in specification (4) and (5) still provide evidence 
in support of statistically and economically significant effects of both variables. 
 
Table II-4: Determinants of households to invest in subsidized pension products 
Dependent: Subsidized pension product = YES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Financial literacy 0.0884***  0.0732*** 0.0602*** 0.0555** 
 (0.0213)  (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0225) 
Financial advice  0.1389*** 0.1326*** 0.0870*** 0.0709** 
  (0.0325) (0.0328) (0.0316) (0.0329) 
Risk aversion    -0.0126** -0.0114* 
    (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Trust    0.0019 0.0017 
    (0.0070) (0.0069) 
Male    -0.0716** -0.0779*** 
    (0.0281) (0.0279) 
Married    0.0162 0.0180 
    (0.0340) (0.0337) 
No. of children living in household    0.0934*** 0.0950*** 
    (0.0154) (0.0152) 
Age under 30    0.3198*** 0.3171*** 
    (0.0657) (0.0652) 
Age 30 to 40    0.2481*** 0.2323*** 
    (0.0632) (0.0623) 
Age 40 to 50    0.2749*** 0.2664*** 
    (0.0598) (0.0591) 
Age 50 to 60    0.1928*** 0.1837*** 
    (0.0597) (0.0587) 
Education    0.0127 0.0132 
    (0.0166) (0.0168) 
Self-employed    -0.1024** -0.1013** 
    (0.0436) (0.0434) 
Unemployed    0.0036 0.0210 
    (0.0559) (0.0555) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table II-4: Determinants of households to invest in subsidized pension products – continued 
 Dependent: Subsidized pension product = YES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income Q2    0.0497 0.0477 
    (0.0475) (0.0473) 
Income Q3    0.1370*** 0.1240** 
    (0.0492) (0.0496) 
Income Q4    0.1621*** 0.1427*** 
    (0.0531) (0.0534) 
Net wealth Q2    0.0232 0.0057 
    (0.0439) (0.0444) 
Net wealth Q3    -0.0299 -0.0518 
    (0.0484) (0.0496) 
Net wealth Q4    -0.0417 -0.0697 
    (0.0573) (0.0591) 
Homeowner    0.0112 0.0060 
    (0.0374) (0.0379) 
Receiving of larger gifts or 
inheritances    0.0149 0.0133 
    (0.0327) (0.0327) 
Save regularly    0.0776** 0.0527 
    (0.0323) (0.0341) 
Non-subsidized pension 
products      0.0685* 
     (0.0349) 
Saving loan contracts     0.0506* 
     (0.0294) 
Risky financial assets     0.0297 
     (0.0355) 
Observations 2,228 2,026 2,000 1,997 1,997 
F-test 16.565 17.288 13.804 8.094 7.784 
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table reports average marginal effects obtained from a Probit regression model of the generic form featuring the 
holding of state-subsidized pension products as the dependent variable.  
 
푆푃푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹퐿 + 훽2 ∗ 퐹퐴 + 훾′풄푖 + 훿′풂푖 + 휀푖 
Specification (1) and (2) show the unconditional effect of financial literacy and financial advice on individual 푖’s holding 
of subsidized pension products. Specification (3) shows the joint effects of financial literacy and financial advice on holding 
subsidized pension products. Specification (4) shows the conditional effect of financial literacy and financial advice on 
holding of subsidized pension products including the vector of control variables 풄푖. Finally, in specification (5) we present 
our baseline model, in which we further add a vector capturing other financial assets in the respondents’ portfolios 풂푖 to 
our regression model. We report detailed variable descriptions in Appendix II-1. The data we use is weighted and draws 
on a subsample of the representative PHF survey. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
More precisely, in our baseline model in specification (5), we document that a 
one-unit increase in financial literacy is associated with a 5.6 percentage point in-
crease in the propensity to hold subsidized pension products. Among the households 
that received investment advice, we document that their propensity to hold subsi-
dized pension products is 7.1 percentage points higher, compared to unadvised 
MEYLL et al.  Leaving money on the table 
 
II-40 
 
households. As a robustness check, we also estimated Equation (1) using a linear 
probability regression model (OLS). The results remain quantitatively unchanged 
and are reported in Appendix II-7. 
With respect to the remaining regressors, although providing the capital preser-
vation guarantee like bank deposits, we find the propensity to hold subsidized pen-
sion products to decrease with higher risk aversion. We further show that subsidized 
pension products are more likely to be held by females. Moreover, we confirm prior 
findings in the literature that the number of children living in the household signif-
icantly affects households’ propensity to hold subsidized pension products (e.g., 
Börsch-Supan et al., 2012; Bucher-Koenen, 2009). In particular, we document that 
having one more child increases households’ propensity to invest in subsidized pen-
sion products by remarkable 9.5 percentage points. However, this finding is not 
surprising, because those products offer large subsidies per child (Bucher-Koenen, 
2009). We also find that the propensity to hold subsidized pension products de-
creases with age. In particular, households younger than 30 are most likely to save 
in subsidized pension products. In addition to, for example, Hibbert, Lawrence, and 
Prakash (2012), whose results suggest that education plays a smaller role for retire-
ment planning compared to financial literacy, we document that education, com-
pared to financial literacy, has a less important role on households’ product choice 
for retirement planning. In terms of labor market effects, we document that self-
employed individuals are less likely to hold subsidized products. While the products 
in our study also provide subsidies for self-employed individuals, our results show 
that self-employed individuals might rely on other forms of investments, such as 
holding large stakes in their own businesses. We find that holding subsidized pen-
sion products is more pronounced among households with above-median income 
(income quartiles 3 and 4). This finding is surprising, because those products are 
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particularly designed for low-income households (i.e., low-income households receive 
the highest subsidy quotas).21 In that, our results confirm prior findings in Bucher-
Koenen (2009), further casting some doubt on the target effectiveness of the pension 
products. Finally, among the other financial assets held in portfolio, we show that 
households having experience with non-subsidized pension products as well as sav-
ing loan contracts are also more likely to engage in subsidized pension products. 
4. Further analyses 
4.1. Alternative explanations to avoid investments in subsidized pension products 
In Table II-5, we assess whether the effects of financial literacy and financial 
advice remain robust when we control for alternative explanations that might ex-
plain why households do not use subsidized pension products. To control for alter-
native explanations, we estimate a series of specifications using the following Probit 
regression model: 
푆푃푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹퐿 + 훽2 ∗ 퐹퐴 + 휔′풇푖 + 훾′풄푖 + 훿′풂푖 + 휀푖 
where 푆푃푖 denotes an indicator variable that equals one for individuals holding 
state-subsidized pension products, 퐹퐿 is the financial literacy score measured on a 
0-3 scale, and 퐹퐴 is an indicator variable that equals one for individuals that ob-
tained investment advice by their house bank during the last two years (i.e. advised 
individuals). 풄푖 and 풂푖 present the vectors of control variables and other financial 
assets held in portfolio analogously to our baseline model in specification (5) of 
Table II-4. In addition, we include a vector 풇푖 that captures four different alterna-
tive explanations. The alternative explanations that we add to our model are li-
quidity constraints, financial crisis effects, savings purpose, and effects of being 
                                      
21 Please see Figure II-2 for the subsidy quotas related to the subsidized pension products under review. 
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indebted. As in our main regression, we estimate average marginal effects to ensure 
the interpretability of the Probit regression results. 
 
Table II-5: Controlling for alternative explanations of not holding subsidized pension products 
Dependent: Subsidized pension product = YES 
 Main result 
+ Liquidity 
constraints 
+ Financial 
crisis effects 
+ Retirement 
savers 
+ Effects of 
debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Financial literacy 0.0555** 0.0547** 0.0546** 0.0551** 0.0552** 
 (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
Financial advice 0.0709** 0.0739** 0.0741** 0.0727** 0.0726** 
 (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0332) 
Excess liquidity 
(6-months income) 
 
-0.0663* -0.0661* -0.0689* -0.0690* 
 
 
(0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0359) (0.0361) 
Loss in financial assets due 
to financial crisis 
  
0.0370 0.0380 0.0381 
 
  
(0.0543) (0.0549) (0.0550) 
Saving for retirement 
   
0.0157 0.0158 
 
   
(0.0328) (0.0328) 
Non-mortgage debt > finan-
cial assets 
    
-0.0023 
 
    
(0.0471) 
Controls (main model) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,970 1,970 
F-test 7.784 7.565 7.322 6.763 6.536 
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table reports average marginal effects obtained from a Probit regression model of the generic form featuring the 
holding of state-subsidized pension products as the dependent variable. 
푆푃푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹퐿 + 훽2 ∗ 퐹퐴 + 휔′풇푖 + 훾′풄풊 + 훿′풂푖 + 휀푖 
In column (1), we reestimate our main model from column (5) of Table II-4. Column (2) further controls for households’ 
liquidity constraints by including a dummy variable that equals one for individuals holding more than 6-months income 
in bank deposits. In column (2), we control for potential effects caused by the financial crisis by including an indicator 
variable that equals one if households report that they experienced substantial losses in financial assets due to the financial 
crisis. Column (4) further controls for households’ savings purpose by including an indicator variable that equals one if 
households’ primary savings reason is saving for old-age provision. Finally, in column (5), we control for potential effects 
caused by indebted households by including an indicator variable that equals one for households carrying more non-
mortgage debt than financial assets. The data we use is weighted and draws on a subsample of the representative PHF 
survey . Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. We report detailed variable descriptions in Appendix II-1. 
 
In specification (1) of Table II-5, we re-estimate our main model in specification 
(5) of Table II-4. Next, in specification (2), we consider that households might avoid 
committing themselves to make regular payments in subsidized pension products 
in fear of potential income disruptions, for example by getting unemployed. In this 
vein, households might only start saving in other assets when precautionary needs 
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are satisfied (Barasinska, Schäfer, and Stephan, 2012). We believe that this should 
not be the case as the monthly payments for subsidized pension plans can usually 
be reduced or paused in such situations. Nevertheless, we adopt empirical findings 
from the literature on households’ emergency fund savings, first conceptualized by 
Johnson and Widdows (1985). The authors defined emergency funds as households’ 
financial holdings in liquid assets, including cash, savings- and checking accounts, 
which cover the households’ liquidity for at least three months. Moreover, these 
liquid savings should ensure that households do not have to alter their living stand-
ards due to income disruptions, such as unemployment or illness. Researchers and 
financial planners recommend that households hold at least two to six months of 
monthly income in liquid savings (i.e., cash, savings-, and checking accounts).22 We 
assess households’ excess liquidity using an indicator variable that equals one if 
households’ liquid savings exceed households’ six-month income. If households with 
that amount of excess liquidity do not hold subsidized pension products, it might 
not be driven by fear of potential income disruptions. Results in specification (2) 
suggest that our main results on financial literacy and financial advice remain ro-
bust when we consider potential liquidity constraints. Somewhat surprisingly, we 
find that households with high liquidity are less likely to engage in subsidized prod-
ucts. This rather counterintuitive finding might be (at least partially) explained by 
the construction of our measure for excess liquidity. In particular, individuals can 
only accumulate high levels of excess liquidity when they save large amounts of 
their monthly income in bank deposits. However, when individuals use subsidized 
pension products, their monthly savings sum is deducted from their income and 
thus does not increase households’ bank deposits. 
                                      
22 For instance, Gathergood and Weber (2014) uses as similar measure of liquid savings to assess households’ 
financial resources available to pay down outstanding consumer credit balances. For an extensive overview of 
different emergency fund levels, please see especially Chang, Hanna, and Fan (1997). 
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In specification (3), we account for households not owning subsidized pension 
products because they suffer from potentially traumatic experiences in, for example, 
the stock market. One such event that affected a large proportion of households 
worldwide was the financial crisis from 2008 (Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer, 
2014). We address this issue by including an indicator variable that equals one if 
households suffered considerable losses in financial assets during the last two years. 
Because our data at hand were collected between 2010 and 2011, we thereby capture 
households that experienced wealth losses during and immediately after the finan-
cial crisis. Even after accounting for realized losses due to the financial crisis, our 
main results regarding financial literacy and financial advice remain robust. Fur-
thermore, the average marginal effect of losses in financial assets due to the financial 
crisis is insignificant, indicating that potentially traumatic experiences, such as the 
financial crisis, do not explain why households do not engage in subsidized pension 
products. 
Next, in specification (4), we control for households’ savings reasons by includ-
ing an indicator variable that equals one for households reporting that their primary 
savings reason is to save for old-age. While our results for financial literacy and 
financial advice remain robust in this specification, the average marginal effect of 
the savings purpose is economically small and statistically insignificant. 
Finally, in specification (5), we further account for the fact that households 
might not engage in subsidized pension products (and potentially any other finan-
cial assets beyond bank deposits), because they use their income to pay down their 
outstanding debt obligations. To account for this, we build an indicator variable 
that equals one if households’ non-mortgage debt exceeds households’ financial as-
sets, and zero otherwise. Results in specification (5) reveal that the observed effects 
of financial literacy and financial advice remain robust. Furthermore, we document 
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that the effect of being indebted does not seem to affect households’ decision to 
hold subsidized pension products. 
4.2. Controlling for observed heterogeneity between advised and unadvised house-
holds 
In this section, we address that advised households might greatly differ in ob-
servable covariates compared to unadvised households, indicating that they show 
unequal (selection) probabilities of receiving investment advice (i.e., selection bias). 
For instance, households that gain a higher average income or that possess more 
wealth probably exhibit a greater propensity to consult financial advisors. We ad-
dress potential selection concerns in Table II-6 by matching advised (treated) 
households with unadvised (control) households in the sample based on their pro-
pensity score to receive financial advice. For each treated household, we use a 1:1 
nearest-neighbor matching approach and match on all variables as in our baseline 
model in column (5) of Table II-4.23 
 
Table II-6: Robustness of results for matched samples 
Dependent: Subsidized pension product = Yes 
  Main results Matched sample 
Financial literacy 0.0555** 0.1094*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0345) 
Financial advice 0.0709** 0.1161*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0370) 
Controls (main model) Yes Yes 
Observations 1,997 1,124 
F-test 7.784 4.735 
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 
In this table, we re-estimate our main results from column (5) of Table II-4 using the matched samples obtained from our 
propensity score matching analysis (PSM). Column (1) replicates the results from our main model and column (2) shows 
the results for the matched sample, respectively. The data we use is weighted and draws on a subsample of the repre-
sentative PHF survey. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. We report detailed variable descriptions in 
Appendix II-1. 
 
                                      
23 Balance tests of covariates before and after matching as well as additional matching quality indicators are 
available upon request. 
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In Table II-6, we present the average marginal effects of our main Probit regres-
sion model in Equation (1), featuring the holding of subsidized pension products as 
the dependent variable. Specification (1) replicates our main results and in specifi-
cation (2) we re-estimate our main model using the matched sample, respectively. 
As can be inferred from the results in Table II-6, the average marginal effects are 
still statistically significant and even higher than in our baseline regression, indi-
cating that our results are robust to a potential selection bias based on distribu-
tional differences in observable covariates between advised and unadvised house-
holds. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we present evidence that, on population level, more than a quarter 
of German households leave considerable amounts of money on the table. Those 
households save using only bank deposits, despite the existence of downward pro-
tected subsidized pension products offering higher expected returns. In light of the 
decreasing relative performance of the statutory pension system, such a behavior is 
particularly harmful for future retirees. We find a positive relationship between 
financial literacy, financial advice and owning subsidized pension products. Alt-
hough studies raise substantive issues regarding conflicted financial advice (e.g., 
Mullainathan et al., 2012), especially due to information asymmetries between ad-
visors and advisees which might lead to opportunistic advisor behavior (Chater et 
al., 2010), our results suggest that financial advisors fulfil their initial role by ex-
plaining the functioning and highlighting the benefits of subsidized pension prod-
ucts. In doing so, financial advisors can add value to households’ savings decisions, 
and guide households to allocate their available financial resources in subsidized 
pension products that are able to generate superior returns than saving in bank 
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deposits. Unlike financial literacy and financial advice, we find that potential li-
quidity constraints, traumatic experiences due to the financial crisis, savings pur-
poses, as well as households’ degree of indebtedness, fail to explain why households 
do not possess subsidized pension products. Further, we do not believe that house-
holds are unaware of the availability of subsidized pension plans. Such products are 
the result of very popular governmental changes to the German retirement system 
initiated by the German Retirement Saving Act of 2001, also being accompanied 
by extensive media coverage and being promoted by both the German government 
as well as the financial services industry. According to a representative study by 
Cosmos Direkt (2011), 83% of German households are aware of the availability of 
Riester products. Thus, we perceive it to be rather unlikely that households in 
Germany are unaware of the availability of subsidized pension products. Rather, 
Coppola and Gasche (2011) describe that Riester products are rather complex and 
thus, many households might not engage in those products because they, for exam-
ple, lack the necessary financial knowledge to do so. The findings in our study 
support this notion as we document that households with higher financial literacy 
and those who receive financial advice are more likely to hold subsidized pension 
products, indicating that they might have a better understanding of complex finan-
cial products. Our study emphasizes the relevance of financial literacy and financial 
advice for sound financial decision-making in increasingly complex financial markets. 
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7. Appendix 
Appendix II-1: Variable descriptions 
Name Description 
Age Ordinal variable that contains head of household’s age. 
Education Ordinal variable that describes the respondent’s highest degree of educa-
tion/qualification: 1- Higher education entrance; 2- non-academic post-
secondary education; 3- University degree or higher. Zero otherwise. 
Excess liquidity Dummy variable that equals one if households’ holdings in bank deposits 
exceed households’ six-month income, and zero otherwise. 
Financial advice Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent received financial ad-
vice during the last three years, zero otherwise. Corresponding PHF item: 
“Has your household used a consulting service at your principal bank in 
the past three years?” 1 - Yes; 2 - No. 
Financial literacy Ordinal variable measuring the number of correct answers to financial 
literacy questions. Corresponding PHF items: 
Question 1: Compound interest effect: "Let us assume that you have a 
balance of 100 EUR on your savings account. This balance bears interest 
at a rate of 2% per year and you leave it for 5 years on this account. How 
high do you think your balance will be after 5 years?" 1-More than 102 
EUR [correct]; 2-Exactly 102 EUR; 3-Less than 102 EUR 
Question 2: Inflation: "Let us assume that your savings account bears 
interest at a rate of 1% per year and the rate of inflation is 2% per year. 
Do you think that in one year’s time the balance on your savings account 
will be the same as, more than, or less than today?" 1-More than today; 
2-The same as today; 3-Less than today [correct] 
Question 3: Diversification: "Do you agree with the following statement: 
‘Investing in shares of a company is less risky than investing in a fund 
containing shares of similar companies’?" 1-Agree; 2-Disagree [correct] 
Homeowner Dummy variable that equals one if the household is homeowner, and zero 
otherwise. 
Household monthly net income Continuous variable measuring households’ monthly income (EUR). 
Household net wealth Continuous variable measuring households’ net wealth (EUR). Net wealth 
is defined as household’s gross wealth minus total outstanding debt. 
Loss in financial assets due to financial crisis Dummy variable that equals one if households experiences substantial 
losses in financial assets due to the financial crisis, and zero otherwise. 
Male Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is male, and zero for 
female. 
Married Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is married, and zero 
otherwise. 
No. of children living in household Ordinal variable measuring the number of children living in household. 
Non-mortgage debt > financial assets Dummy variable that equals one if households’ outstanding non-mortgage 
debt exceeds households’ financial assets, and zero otherwise. 
Outstanding mortgage debt Continuous variable measuring households’ outstanding mortgage debt. 
Outstanding non-mortgage debt Continuous variable measuring households’ non-mortgage debt. The total 
amount of outstanding non-mortgage debt includes outstanding balances 
of credit lines or over-drafts, outstanding balances of credit cards, and 
outstanding balances on all other non-collateralized loans (i.e., student 
loans, car loans, consumer loans, instalment loans, and private loans from 
relatives, friends and employers). 
Receiving of larger gifts or inheritances Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent (or any other house-
hold member) has ever received a larger gift or inheritance (i.e., money, 
residential real estate, usufruct, property, companies, securities or stocks, 
jewelry, furniture or art, life insurances, and other assets), and zero oth-
erwise. 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix II-1: Variable descriptions - continued 
Retired Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is retired, and zero otherwise. 
Risk aversion Ordinal variable capturing respondents’ risk aversion on a scale from [0] - Very 
willing to take risks, to [10] Not at all willing to take risks. 
Save regularly Dummy variable that equals one if the household reports to save regularly each 
month, and zero otherwise. 
Saving for retirement Dummy variable that equals one if household reports that old-age provision to be 
their primary savings reason, and zero otherwise. 
Self-employed Dummy variable that equals one if the household is self-employed, zero otherwise. 
Trust Ordinal variable capturing respondents’ general trust levels on a scale from [0] - I 
do not trust other at all, to [10] I trust others completely. 
Unemployed Dummy variable that equals one if the household is unemployed, and zero other-
wise. 
Value of household’s main residence Continuous variable measuring households’ value of main residence. 
 
 
Appendix II-2: Description of financial asset variables 
Name Description 
Risky financial assets Continuous variable measuring households’ risky financial assets, including 
funds, stocks, bonds, and other risky financial assets. 
Funds Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of funds held in portfolio. 
Stocks Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of stocks held in portfolio. 
Bonds Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of bonds held in portfolio. 
Other risky financial assets Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of certificates and other 
risky financial assets held in portfolio. 
Bank deposits Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of bank deposits, including 
checking accounts, positive balances on credit cards and savings accounts. 
Checking accounts Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of money held in checking 
accounts and credit cards. 
Savings accounts Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of money held in savings 
accounts. 
Saving loan contracts Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of money held in saving 
loan contracts. 
Pension products Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of money invested in pen-
sion products. 
State-subsidized pension products Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of money held in state-sub-
sidized pension products, including Riester or Rürup subsidized bank savings 
plans, saving loan contracts, mutual fund savings plans, classic pension plans, 
occupational pension plans, and other Riester or Rürup plans. 
Non-subsidized pension products Continuous variable measuring households’ amount of money held in non-sub-
sidized pension products, including occupational pensions, non-subsidized life 
insurance policies and other non-subsidized pension plans.  
Total financial assets Continuous variable measuring households’ total financial assets (risky financial 
assets, bank deposits, saving loan contracts and pension products). 
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Appendix II-3: Performance analysis of subsidized pension plans  
Yearly income 
Single 
no children 
Single 
1 child 
Married 
no children 
Married 
1 child 
Married  
2 children 
10,000.00 € 2.97% 10.07% 6.43% 9.22% 10.62% 
20,000.00 € 1.95% 4.22% 2.72% 6.12% 9.97% 
40,000.00 € 2.72% 2.72% 1.95% 2.57% 4.02% 
60,000.00 € 3.31% 3.31% 2.32% 2.32% 3.07% 
90,000.00 € 3.31% 3.31% 2.94% 2.94% 3.23% 
This table shows internal rates of returns for exemplary Riester contracts that started in 2010 and run for 30 years. As 
such con-tracts are heterogeneous in their design and underlying investments, we estimate internal rates of return only 
for the subsidies to illustrate their beneficial effect. Thus, we assume that the returns from the underlying investments do 
not exceed the costs of the Riester contracts and are used to cover them. Furthermore, we assume that the investors’ 
yearly income does not change during the contract and that the investors chose the size of their contributions to receive 
the maximum potential subsidies. Finally, we assume that marital partners have only one income and that the subsidies 
for children are received for 20 years. The subsidies for children depend on their eligibility for child benefits. Children are 
eligible for child benefits as long as their education is not completed and they are under 25 years old. 
 
 
Appendix II-4: Savings behavior in Germany (population level) 
German 
population  Amount of assets in € 
 N = 3,565      
Name %  Mean Median SD N 
Risky Financial Assets 23.14%  48,740 15,000 172,429 1,160 
Funds 17.11%  28,756 10,000 91,765 799 
Stocks 10.98%  28,552 8,980 116,625 664 
Bonds 5.59%  48,384 15,800 119,779 345 
Other risky fin. assets 2.39%  21,805 9,000 57,782 150 
Bank deposits 91.04%  19,637 6,500 41,217 3,319 
Checking accounts 82.45%  3,681 1,500 9,629 3,020 
Savings accounts 71.17%  20,853 7,800 42,448 2,700 
Saving loan contracts (excl. state-subsidized) 35.12%  7,481 3,700 13,915 1,289 
Pension products 54.56%  32,888 14,300 59,856 2,081 
State-subsidized pension products 25.97%  6,738 2,400 20,785 954 
Non-subsidized pension products 47.10%  34,383 15,380 59,735 1,870 
Total financial assets   52,152 20,000 125,701 3,447 
This table shows population-level savings and investment behavior of German households (N = 3,565). Amounts of assets 
with positive values are conditional on owning the respective asset class. The data is weighted and representative for the 
German population. For a detailed variable description, we refer to Appendix II-2. 
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Appendix II-5: Summary statistics (population level) 
  German population 
    N Mean SD Min. 10th 25th Median 75th 90th Max. 
Financial literacy 3,498 2.471 0.747 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 
Financial advice 3,257 0.253 0.435 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Risk aversion 3,562 6.354 2.391 0 3 5 7 8 10 10 
Trust 3,558 5.413 2.131 0 3 4 5 7 8 10 
Male 3,565 0.510 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Married 3,565 0.502 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
No. of children living in household 3,565 0.458 0.856 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 
Age 3,565 52.00 17.71 17 29 38 50 67 77 90 
Education 3,565 0.526 0.837 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Self-employed 3,565 0.068 0.251 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Unemployed 3,565 0.052 0.222 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Retired 3,565 0.322 0.467 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Household monthly net income 3,565 2,326 2,324 100 830 1,250 1,900 3,000 4,000 100,000 
Household net wealth 3,565 156,453 459,837 0 0 5,000 40,000 180,000 390,000 60,000,000 
Value of household’s main residence 3,565 90,961 156,400 0 0 0 0 150,000 260,000 3,600,000 
Outstanding mortgage debt 3,565 24,016 72,747 0 0 0 0 0 89,000 1,800,000 
Outstanding non-mortgage debt 3,565 3,350 14,769 0 0 0 0 1,300 7,100 362,000 
Homeowner 3,565 0.418 0.493 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Receiving of larger gifts or inheritances 3,565 0.273 0.446 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Save regularly 3,565 0.560 0.496 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
This table reports population-level summary statistics of German households. The data is weighted and representative for the German population. We provide detailed 
variable descriptions in Appendix II-1. 
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Appendix II-6: Fraction of subsidized pension product owners across demographic profiles 
 Fraction of SP owners       
 High (Yes) Low (No) Diff.  t-Stat. N 
Financial literacy 0.402 0.298 0.104 3.53*** 2,228 
Financial advice 0.472 0.328 0.144 4.11*** 2,026 
Risk aversion 0.336 0.396 -0.060 2.12** 2,261 
Trust 0.396 0.345 0.051 1.77* 2,258 
Male 0.338 0.401 -0.063 2.21** 2,261 
Married 0.434 0.299 0.135 4.76*** 2,261 
No. of children living in household 0.528 0.268 0.260 9.10*** 2,261 
Age 0.327 0.407 -0.080 2.83*** 2,261 
Education 0.406 0.345 0.060 2.06** 2,261 
Self-employed 0.288 0.377 -0.089 2.16** 2,261 
Unemployed 0.231 0.380 -0.149 3.43*** 2,261 
Household monthly net income 0.475 0.266 0.210 7.55*** 2,261 
Household net wealth 0.412 0.328 0.084 2.96*** 2,261 
Homeowner 0.417 0.337 0.080 2.73*** 2,261 
Receiving of larger gifts or inheritances 0.422 0.348 0.074 2.29** 2,261 
Save regularly 0.433 0.278 0.155 5.49*** 2,261 
This table reports the fractions of households holding subsidized pension products across demographic profiles. For ex-
ample, the first row reports the fraction of households owning subsidized pension products distinguishing between the 
groups of households with high financial literacy vs. households with low financial literacy. Analogously, the second row 
compares the fractions of households holding subsidized pension products distinguishing between advised and unadvised 
households. For continuous variables, we use median splits to create high and low groups. The data we use is weighted 
and draws on a subsample of the representative PHF survey. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix II-7: Determinants of households to invest in subsidized pension products (LPM model) 
Dependent: Subsidized pension product = YES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Financial literacy 0.0841***  0.0699*** 0.0579*** 0.0543*** 
 (0.0191)  (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0210) 
Financial advice  0.1438*** 0.1375*** 0.0948*** 0.0766** 
  (0.0350) (0.0354) (0.0348) (0.0363) 
Risk aversion    -0.0114* -0.0101 
    (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Trust    0.0031 0.0028 
    (0.0068) (0.0068) 
Male    -0.0672** -0.0728** 
    (0.0288) (0.0287) 
Married    0.0140 0.0147 
    (0.0344) (0.0341) 
No. of children living in household    0.1040*** 0.1055*** 
    (0.0171) (0.0170) 
Age under 30    0.2470*** 0.2404*** 
    (0.0507) (0.0511) 
Age 30 to 40    0.1790*** 0.1611*** 
    (0.0469) (0.0467) 
Age 40 to 50    0.2077*** 0.1965*** 
    (0.0421) (0.0423) 
Age 50 to 60    0.1283*** 0.1158*** 
    (0.0389) (0.0391) 
Education    0.0138 0.0130 
    (0.0171) (0.0174) 
Self-employed    -0.0898** -0.0860** 
    (0.0391) (0.0394) 
Unemployed    0.0019 0.0155 
    (0.0503) (0.0498) 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix II-7: Determinants of households to invest in subsidized pension products (LPM model) – continued 
 Dependent: Subsidized pension product = YES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income Q2    0.0370 0.0381 
    (0.0448) (0.0449) 
Income Q3    0.1283*** 0.1190** 
    (0.0490) (0.0494) 
Income Q4    0.1522*** 0.1380*** 
    (0.0534) (0.0534) 
Net wealth Q2    0.0231 0.0041 
    (0.0432) (0.0440) 
Net wealth Q3    -0.0280 -0.0522 
    (0.0482) (0.0500) 
Net wealth Q4    -0.0502 -0.0808 
    (0.0585) (0.0604) 
Homeowner    0.0164 0.0105 
    (0.0385) (0.0392) 
Receiving of larger gifts or inheritances    0.0214 0.0194 
    (0.0339) (0.0338) 
Save regularly    0.0753** 0.0503 
    (0.0328) (0.0347) 
Non-subsidized pension products      0.0631* 
     (0.0349) 
Saving loan contracts     0.0519* 
     (0.0312) 
Risky financial assets     0.0373 
     (0.0382) 
Observations 2,228 2,026 2,000 1,997 1,997 
R2 0.014 0.017 0.027 0.149 0.156 
F-test 19.390 16.883 14.881 13.245 12.500 
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
In this table, we reestimate our main results from Table II-4 using a linear probability regression model (OLS) instead of 
the generic Probit model in Equation (1). Instead of average marginal effects, we report the coefficients estimates of the 
linear regression models. Analogously to Table II-4, specification (1) and (2) show the unconditional effect of financial 
literacy and financial advice on individual 푖’s holding of subsidized pension products. Specification (3) shows the joint 
effects of financial literacy and financial advice on holding subsidized pension products. Specification (4) shows the con-
ditional effect of financial literacy and financial advice on holding of subsidized pension products including the vector of 
control variables 풄푖. Finally, in specification (5) we present our baseline model, in which we further add a vector capturing 
other financial assets in the respondents’ portfolios 풂푖 to our regression model. We report detailed variable descriptions 
in Appendix II-1. The data we use is weighted and draws on a subsample of the representative PHF survey. Tailor 
linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing number of smartphone owners worldwide has paved the way for 
traditional banking payment services, and nonfinancial companies, such as Apple, 
Google, or PayPal, to attract new customers and open up new markets by extending 
their range of products and services, particularly with respect to offering innovative 
payment alternatives. One prominent example among innovative payment alterna-
tives is mobile payment technology enabling customers to conduct payments with 
mobile devices, such as smartphones.1 In particular, customers attempting to use 
their smartphones for mobile payments can store card information of credit or debit 
cards in mobile wallets on their smartphones. Once the card information has been 
stored in a mobile wallet, the smartphone can be used to conduct payments by, for 
example, tapping or waving it over a sensor (e.g., near field communication termi-
nals) at the point of sale. 
On the upside, mobile payments clearly provide substantial benefits for both 
customers and merchants, because they are immediate available and increase time 
efficiency at the point of sale (Polasik et al., 2013). However, on the downside, there 
are ample reasons to believe that mobile payments might increase individuals’ over-
all spending. In this regard, studies reveal that the pain associated with paying 
varies between different payment methods (e.g., Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; 
Soman, 2003). The principle behind the pain associated with paying refers to the 
transparency of these payment methods with cash being the most transparent 
method (Soman, 2003). More precisely, while parting with cash generates the high-
est felt pain of payment, the pain associated with less transparent payment methods, 
such as credit or debit cards, is much lower and is likely to increase individuals’ 
                                      
1 Mobile payment is here defined as conducting payments through mobile wallets stored on respondents’ 
smartphones. 
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overall spending (e.g., Feinberg, 1986; Raghubir and Srivastava, 2008; Shah et al., 
2016). Recent studies suggest that innovative payment methods, such as mobile 
payments, are even less transparent than debit or credit cards (Shah et al., 2016). 
However, potential consequences of using mobile payments on individuals’ spending 
behavior and debt accumulation have hitherto, to the best of our knowledge, not 
been investigated.  
Hence, in our study we assess how potential negative economic outcomes are 
related to mobile payment technology usage. In particular, this paper studies the 
relationship between using smartphones to conduct mobile payments and costly 
credit card behaviors, which we define as either making only the minimum payment, 
paying late fees or over the limit fees. These credit card behaviors are likely to 
occur when individuals highly increase their spending and have been shown to be 
particularly detrimental to individuals’ financial situation (Bertaut, Haliassos, and 
Reiter, 2009). Since mobile payment users conduct payments through mobile wal-
lets that are often connected to a credit card (Dodini et al., 2016; Trütsch, 2016), 
we conjecture that this payment method is even less salient compared to directly 
paying with credit cards, especially because individuals might not even recognize 
that the payment has occurred (Shah et al., 2016). Thus, we hypothesize that mo-
bile payment users should be more likely to exhibit costly credit card behavior, 
because the pain associated with mobile payments is significantly lower, compared 
to the pain associated with conventional payment methods. In addition, if mobile 
payment users were more likely to exhibit costly credit card behavior, we would 
expect a relationship between respondents’ likelihood to engage in costly credit card 
behavior and higher frequency of mobile payment usage. Hence, we hypothesize 
that frequent users of mobile payment technology are more likely to exhibit costly 
credit card behavior, compared to infrequent mobile payment users. 
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To test these hypotheses, we use data from the 2015 National Financial Capa-
bility Study (NFCS), which comprises both information on individuals’ credit card 
behavior and a specific question asking respondents whether they use their 
smartphone to pay for products or services in person. Despite controlling for deter-
minants that have been previously identified to affect individuals’ credit card be-
havior, such as financial literacy, financial risk tolerance or financial situation (e.g., 
Lusardi and Tufano, 2015; Mottola, 2013), we contribute to the literature and find 
that using mobile payments is associated with a 4.9 percentage points increase in 
the likelihood to exhibit costly credit card behavior. Moreover, conditional on using 
mobile payments, our results provide some evidence that the frequency of mobile 
payment usage is strongly related to costly credit card behavior. We document that 
frequent users are approximately 5.0 percentage points more likely to exhibit costly 
credit card behavior, compared to infrequent mobile payment users. In the light of 
the already high levels of credit card debt in the US, our findings have important 
implications, because they suggest that mobile payments are strongly related to 
individuals’ credit card debt accumulation. 
2. Material and methods 
To assess the relationship between mobile payment usage and individuals’ credit 
card behavior, we use representative survey data from the 2015 National Financial 
Capability Study (NFCS) covering more than 25,000 US households. The NFCS 
provides a rich set of items related to individuals’ sociodemographics as well as 
measures for financial literacy, and financial risk tolerance. Moreover, the NFCS 
comprises questions on certain credit card behaviors of which three behaviors, in 
particular, making only the minimum payment, paying late fees or being charged 
an over the limit fee, are likely to generate sizeable interest or fees (Lin et al., 2016). 
Thus, we measure costly credit card behavior using a dummy variable that equals 
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one if a respondent shows at least one of these three behaviors, zero otherwise.2 In 
our sample, 36.2% of respondents exhibit at least one of these three costly credit 
card behaviors. To identify individuals that use mobile payment technology, we use 
a specific item in the NFCS that asks respondents whether they use their 
smartphone as a payment instrument. More precisely, mobile payment is here de-
fined as using the smartphone to pay for a product or service in person at a store, 
gas station, or restaurant.3 The mobile payment is executed, for example, by wav-
ing/tapping the mobile phone over a sensor at checkout, scanning a barcode or QR 
code using the mobile phone, or using some other mobile app at checkout (Lin et 
al., 2016). We classify respondents as users of mobile payment technology if they 
report to at least sometimes use their smartphone to pay for products and services 
in person at a store, gas station, or restaurant, and create a dummy variable ‘User’ 
that equals one for users, and zero for non-users, respectively. Throughout this 
study, we may use the term ‘users’ for respondents who use mobile payments and 
‘non-users’ for those who do not use mobile payment technology. 
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table III-1 presents descriptive statistics of US households distinguishing be-
tween users and non-users. To begin, 22.7% of respondents in our data report to be 
mobile payment users, which corresponds well to other survey data reporting 24% 
of the US population being mobile payment users (Dodini et al., 2016).4 However, 
                                      
2 For brevity, we combine the three costly credit card behaviors to one single measure. However, our main 
results do not change materially when we analyze each credit card behavior separately. 
3 The strict wording of this item allows us to isolate the effect of using the smartphone as a payment 
instrument in stores, rather than using the smartphone for purchases conducted online at home, such as shop-
ping in Amazon. 
4 Using data from the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice in the United States, Trütsch (2016) shows 
that already 18% of respondents used mobile payments in 2012. The same survey has been conducted in 2015 
again and results reveal that mobile payment usage increased to 23.3% (Greene, Schuh, and Stavins, 2017). 
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please note that mobile payment users may also use other payment methods, such 
as credit or debit cards, but we do not have information on the shares of each 
payment method used by an individual. 
 
Table III-1: Demographic profiles of mobile payment users vs. non-users 
This table reports demographic profiles for the whole sample of US households as well as for users and non-users of mobile 
payment technology separately. The data is weighted and representative for the whole US population. For detailed 
variable descriptions, please refer to Appendix III-1. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 US population Users Non-users Diff. T-stat N 
User 0.227     27,236 
Financial literacy 3.301 2.937 3.423 -0.486 17.95*** 26,502 
Risk tolerance 5.186 6.795 4.693 2.101 48.22*** 26,734 
Female 0.514 0.439 0.537 -0.098 11.50*** 27,564 
Married 0.520 0.492 0.531 -0.038 4.47*** 27,564 
Children 0.647 0.620 0.659 -0.038 4.56*** 27,564 
White 0.650 0.498 0.697 -0.199 23.29*** 27,564 
Age < 35 0.305 0.547 0.230 0.317 38.17*** 27,564 
Age > 35 & <= 50 0.343 0.354 0.340 0.014 1.72* 27,564 
Age > 50 0.352 0.099 0.430 -0.331 56.39*** 27,564 
Education 1.475 1.554 1.454 0.100 8.28*** 27,564 
Self-employed 0.071 0.074 0.070 0.004 0.86 27,564 
Unemployed 0.065 0.061 0.066 -0.005 1.17 27,564 
Income < $35k 0.358 0.321 0.366 -0.045 5.48*** 27,564 
Income > $35k & <= $75k 0.350 0.346 0.352 -0.007 0.80 27,564 
Income > $75k 0.292 0.333 0.281 0.052 6.58*** 27,564 
 
In general, we find that mobile payment users are less financially literate and 
have higher levels of financial risk tolerance, compared to non-users. The use of 
mobile payment technology is more pronounced among the younger population. In 
particular, 54.7% of individuals younger than 35 use their smartphone to conduct 
mobile payments. In line with this finding, bivariate results suggest that users are 
more likely to be unmarried and childless. Finally, we document that users are more 
likely to be male and to possess higher levels of education and income. We provide 
detailed variable descriptions in Appendix III-1. 
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3.2. Regression analysis 
3.2.1. Main results 
In Table III-2, we present the results of a series of linear probability model 
regressions (LPM), in which we regress costly credit card behavior on mobile pay-
ment usage and a large set of control variables. Controls included are individuals’ 
demographics, such as age, gender, marital status, income and educational level. 
Further, we control for individuals’ financial literacy level and risk tolerance. Fi-
nally, we add financial controls (e.g., number of credit cards or having a checking 
account) and a set of debt type controls (e.g., outstanding mortgage or student 
loans) to control for individuals’ debt behavior. The full set of control variables is 
comprised of all variables displayed in Appendix III-1. In column (1) of Table III-2 
we present the main result of our study. We find that using mobile payment tech-
nology is strongly related to individuals’ costly credit card behavior, although we 
control for a large number of factors previously identified to determine individuals’ 
credit card behavior. In addition to being highly significant in statistical terms, this 
effect is also economically meaningful. The coefficient of mobile payment usage 
indicates that using mobile payments is associated with a 4.9 percentage points 
increase in the likelihood to exhibit costly credit card behavior. 
The coefficients of the remaining variables, such as financial literacy, are in line 
with prior studies analyzing the determinants of individuals’ costly credit card be-
havior (Mottola, 2013). In column (2), we investigate whether the frequency of 
mobile payment usage is related to respondents’ likelihood to exhibit costly credit 
card behavior. 
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Table III-2: Mobile payments and costly credit card behavior 
This table presents coefficients obtained from a LPM regression featuring an indicator variable for individuals’ costly 
credit card behavior as the dependent variable. In column (1), the main explanatory variable ‘User’ is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the respondent reports to use her smartphone to pay for a product of service in person. In column (2), 
we analyze whether the frequency of mobile payment usage has an impact on costly credit card behavior. Hence, we 
restrict our sample to respondents that use mobile payment technology and include a dummy variable ‘Frequent user’ 
that equals one if the respondent reports to frequently use her smartphone for mobile payments, zero otherwise. The data 
is weighted and representative for the US population. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients 
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent: Credit card misbehavior 
 Full sample Mobile payment users 
 (1) (2) 
User 0.0491***  
 (0.0102)  
Frequent user  0.0498*** 
  (0.0193) 
Financial literacy -0.0233*** -0.0207*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0057) 
Risk tolerance 0.0010 0.0005 
 (0.0016) (0.0038) 
Female 0.0044 -0.0017 
 (0.0072) (0.0159) 
Married 0.0005 -0.0136 
 (0.0084) (0.0192) 
Children 0.0418*** 0.0387** 
 (0.0084) (0.0194) 
White -0.0154* 0.0108 
 (0.0084) (0.0160) 
Age > 35 & <= 50 -0.0173 -0.0310* 
 (0.0106) (0.0181) 
Age > 50 -0.0972*** -0.0885*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0271) 
Education -0.0111** -0.0326*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0111) 
Self-employed 0.0321** 0.0073 
 (0.0137) (0.0317) 
Unemployed -0.0169 -0.0785* 
 (0.0216) (0.0455) 
Income > $35k & <= $75k -0.0087 0.0035 
 (0.0105) (0.0232) 
Income > $75k -0.0398*** -0.0284 
 (0.0120) (0.0268) 
Intercept 0.3786*** 0.4406*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0699) 
Additional controls Yes Yes 
Observations 19,165 4,240 
F-test 311.531 68.124 
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.315 0.279 
 
The coefficient of ‘Frequent user’ in column (2) indicates that, conditional on 
using mobile payments, respondents that state to frequently use mobile payment 
technology are approximately 5.0 percentage points more likely to exhibit costly 
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credit card behavior, compared to users who state that they only sometimes use 
this technology. Overall, these results suggest that mobile payments are strongly 
related to increases individuals’ spending behavior. 
We also address concerns that the relationship between mobile payments and 
costly credit card behavior might be a statistical artifact by running Monte Carlo 
permutation tests in Appendix III-2. The p-value of 0.0000 indicates that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between mobile payment 
usage and costly credit card behavior, indicating that our main finding is unlikely 
to be a statistical artifact. In unreported analyses, we reestimate our baseline re-
gression using subsamples to control for various variables that might distort our 
results. For example, we rerun regressions using subsamples for different age and 
income groups, and exclude respondents that exhibited significant drops in income. 
Results do not change in any substantive way. 
3.2.2. Robustness: Selection bias and endogeneity 
In this section, we account for a potential selection bias of mobile payment usage, 
because respondents that use mobile payment technology can greatly differ in ob-
servable covariates compared to non-users, indicating that they show unequal (se-
lection) probabilities to use mobile payment technology. To overcome this issue, we 
perform propensity score matching analysis (PSM) to account for the potential 
selection bias of individuals’ likelihood to use mobile payments. First, we estimate 
a logistic regression featuring mobile payment usage as the dependent variable, 
including all of the variables in Table III-2 as control variables. Based on the pro-
pensity scores, we build a control sample of non-users that exhibit the same covari-
ates as mobile payment users by matching users with their non-user sociodemo-
graphic ‘twins’ using a 1:1 nearest-neighbor matching approach without replace-
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ment. This approach yields to a matched sample with well-balanced covariates be-
tween users (treated) and non-users (controls), i.e., there are no statistically signif-
icant differences between both groups after the matching.5 Second, we reestimate 
the linear probability model regression from column (1) of Table III-2 using the 
matched (balanced) sample in Table III-3. As can be inferred from the results in 
Table III-3, the coefficient of ‘User’ is even slightly higher than in our baseline 
regression and is still highly statistically significant, indicating that our results are 
robust to a potential selection bias based on distributional differences in observable 
covariates between users and non-users of mobile payments. 
 
Table III-3: Reestimation of main results using matched sample 
In this table, we re-estimate our main results from column (1) of Table III-2 using the matched samples obtained from 
our PSM analysis. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 Dependent: Credit card misbehavior 
User 0.0639*** 
 (0.0123) 
Intercept 0.3877*** 
 (0.0636) 
Controls as in Table III-2 Yes 
Observations 6,530 
F-test 88.072 
F-test p-value 0.000 
R2 0.270 
 
Finally, in Table III-4, we attempt to address potential endogeneity issues re-
lated to our main explanatory variable ‘User’. In particular, the coefficient of mobile 
payment usage in Table III-2 could be biased either due to reverse causality (i.e., 
respondents that exhibit costly credit card behavior are more likely to use mobile 
payments) or due to confounding (omitted) variables, which are both correlated 
with the use of mobile payment and the error term of the linear probability regres-
sion model.  
                                      
5 Results are available upon request. 
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Table III-4: IV regression results 
This table shows second stage IV GMM linear probability model estimates of our baseline model in column (1) of Table III-2
instrumenting mobile payment usage using generated instruments after Lewbel (2012). Standard errors are robust. ***, **, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.     
 
Dependent: 
Credit card misbehavior 
User 0.0413*** 
(0.0156) 
Intercept 0.3706*** 
(0.0362) 
Controls as in Table III-2 Yes 
Observations 19,165 
F-test 424.840 
F-test of excluded instruments (p-value) 0.000 
R2 0.315 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in first-stage regression (p-value) 0.000 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.532 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.409 
 
Despite controlling for a large number of variables, one possible omitted variable 
that could bias our results is individuals’ lack of self-control. In this regard, studies 
have shown that lower levels of self-control are related to compulsive use of mobile 
phones (Billieux, 2012; Billieux, Van der Linden, and Rochat, 2008), and a lack of 
self-control has also been shown to affect individuals’ debt behavior (Gathergood, 
2012). Hence, omitting individuals’ self-control from the linear probability regres-
sion model could lead to either under- or overestimation of the effect of mobile 
payment on credit card behavior. 
To circumvent both reverse causality and omitted variable bias, we estimate a 
linear probability instrumental variable model. Because we lack external instru-
ments for mobile payment usage, we resort to an IV method in which we instrument 
mobile payment usage using generated instruments after Lewbel (2012).6 The in-
strumented coefficient of ‘User’ in Table III-4 remains economically and statistically 
significant, and the endogeneity test (p-value 0.532) indicates that the null hypoth-
esis of the mobile payment’s exogeneity cannot be rejected. Although our results 
                                      
6 Please see especially Bannier and Schwarz (2018), Deuflhard, Georgarakos, and Inderst, (2017) or Meyll, 
Pauls, and Walter, (2017) for more details on the method proposed in Lewbel (2012). 
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suggest causality between mobile payments and costly credit card behavior, results 
might be interpreted with caution. This is due to the nature of survey data, which 
does not allow us to rule out any remaining endogeneity concerns. While this might 
present a data limitation of our study, future research might resort to experimental 
settings in order to mitigate any remaining endogeneity concerns. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper, based on data of a large representative US household survey, inves-
tigates the relationship between using mobile payment technology and individuals’ 
credit card behavior. While research yet focused on the determinants of the adop-
tion of mobile payment technology, potential economic consequences of using mo-
bile payments have hitherto - to the best of our knowledge - not been investigated. 
In our study, we document that using smartphones to conduct mobile payments is 
strongly associated with individuals’ likelihood to exhibit costly credit card behav-
ior. Moreover, conditional on using mobile payments, our results provide further 
evidence that the frequency of mobile payment usage is strongly related to costly 
credit card behavior. Our results have important implications, because they reveal 
that mobile payments are associated with credit card debt accumulation of US 
households. 
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6. Appendix 
Appendix III-1: Variable descriptions 
Name Description 
Age < 35 Dummy variable that equals one if respondent’s age is less than 35, zero otherwise. 
Age > 35 & <= 50 Dummy variable that equals one if respondent’s age is more than 35 and less than 50, 
zero otherwise. 
Age > 50 Dummy variable that equals one if respondent’s age is more than 50, zero otherwise. 
Auto loan Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to have any auto loans, zero oth-
erwise. 
Checking account Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent owns a checking account, zero other-
wise. 
Children Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent reports to have financially dependent 
children, zero otherwise. 
Credit card misbehavior Dummy variable that equals one if respondent shows at least one costly credit card mis-
behavior, zero otherwise. We relate credit card misbehavior to either paying the mini-
mum payment, being charged a late fee or being charged an over the limit fee. 
Education Ordinal variable that describes the respondent’s highest degree of education: 1 - Higher 
education entrance; 2 - Non-academic post-secondary education; 3 - University degree or 
higher. Zero otherwise. 
Female Dummy variable that equals one if respondent is female, zero otherwise. 
Financial fragility Dummy variable that equals one if respondent would have at least problems to come up 
with $2,000 if an unexpected need arose within the next month, zero otherwise. 
Financial literacy Ordinal variable measuring the number of correct answers to financial literacy questions, 
ranging from zero correct to six correct answers. For the exact wording of financial liter-
acy questions (corresponding NFCS items: M6, M7, M8, M9, M10, M31) please refer to 
http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_State_by_State_Qre.pdf 
Home equity loan Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to have any home equity loans, 
zero otherwise. 
Homeowner Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to own her home, zero otherwise. 
Income < $35k Dummy variable that equals one if respondents’ income is less than $35,000, zero other-
wise. 
Income > $35k  & <= $75k Dummy variable that equals one if respondents’ income is more than $35,000 and less 
than $75,000, zero otherwise. 
Income > $75k Dummy variable that equals one if respondents’ income is more than $75,000, zero other-
wise. 
Married Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to be married, zero otherwise. 
Mortgage loan Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to have a mortgage on her home, 
zero otherwise. 
Nonbank borrowing Dummy variable that equals one if respondent has either taken out an auto title loan, a 
short-term "payday" loan, used a pawnshop or used a rent-to-own-store in the past 5 
years, zero otherwise. 
Number of credit cards Categorical variable measuring respondent’s number of credit cards (NFCS item F1) 
from 1 [one credit card] to 6 [more than 20 credit cards]. For exact number of credit 
cards, please refer to http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/down-
loads/NFCS_2015_State_by_State_Qre.pdf. 
Rainy day funds Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to have set aside rainy day funds 
that would cover expenses for 3 months, zero otherwise. 
Risk tolerance Ordinal variable that measures the respondents’ willingness to take risks with financial 
investments risk on a scale from 1 [not at all willing] to 10 [very willing]. 
Risky assets Dummy variable that equals one if respondent, not including retirement accounts, owns 
risky financial assets (e.g. stocks, bonds, mutual funds or other securities), zero other-
wise. 
Self-employed Dummy variable that equals one if respondent is self-employed, zero otherwise. 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix III-1: Variable descriptions – continued 
Shock: Drop in income Dummy variable that equals one if respondent experienced a large and unexpected drop in in-
come during the last twelve months, zero otherwise. 
Student loan Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to have outstanding student loans, zero 
otherwise. 
Unemployed Dummy variable that equals one if respondent is unemployed, zero otherwise. 
Unpaid medical bills Dummy variable that equals one if respondent reports to have any unpaid medical bills, zero 
otherwise. 
User Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent at least sometimes uses her smartphone to 
to pay for a product or service in person. Corresponding NFCS item: How often do you use 
your mobile phone to pay for a product or service in person at a store, gas station, or restau-
rant (e.g., by waving/tapping your mobile phone over a sensor at checkout, scanning a bar-
code or QR code using your mobile phone, or using some other mobile app at checkout)? 1 - 
Frequently; 2 - Sometimes; 3 - Never; 4 - Don’t know; 5 - Prefer not to say. 
White Dummy variable that equals one if respondent’s ethnicity is white, zero otherwise.  
 
Appendix III-2: Permutation tests: Random assignment of mobile payment usage 
This table reports p-values from Monte Carlo permutation tests in which we assign each respondent a random mobile 
payment user status. We use 10,000 random draws, indicating that we repeat the random procedure of assigning mobile 
payment usage to respondents 10,000 times, and reestimate our baseline regression from column (1) of Table III-2 for 
each random draw. The reported p-value presents the number of randomly permutated datasets that yield a regression 
coefficient larger than or equal to the reported coefficient for the variable ‘User’ from our regressions of costly credit card 
behavior on mobile payment usage and control variables in column (1) of Table III-2. All variables are defined in Appendix 
III-1.     
 Dependent: Credit card misbehavior 
User 0.0491*** 
p-value [0.0000] 
Controls as in Table III-2 Yes 
Permutations 10,000 
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* The project described in this paper relies on data from survey(s) administered by 
the Understanding America Study, which is maintained by the Center for Economic 
and Social Research (CESR) at the University of Southern California. The content 
of this paper is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily 
represent the official views of USC or UAS. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, a vast number of studies have consistently documented a 
gender gap in financial knowledge, indicating that women possess lower levels of 
financial knowledge compared to men (e.g., Bucher-Koenen et al., 2017; Fonseca et 
al., 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). Unfortunately, policymakers and researchers 
around the world are still lacking satisfactory solutions to mitigate gender dispari-
ties in financial literacy (Fernandes, Lynch Jr., and Netemeyer, 2014). 
At the same time, disrupting technologies in the financial industry, such as 
blockchain or artificial intelligence are on the rise, offering individuals novel invest-
ment opportunities. While some of those products might provide attractive invest-
ment opportunities, they also require individuals to possess specific knowledge 
about financial technologies (fintech) as well as a correct assessment of the under-
lying risks associated with such investments (e.g., Greimel-Fuhrmann, 2018). 
Against this background, recent news reports raise serious concerns of a for-
mation of novel gender gaps related to fintech knowledge (e.g., Bowles, 2018; 
Kuchler, 2018; Lam, 2017). In order to counteract this trend, a profound under-
standing of the underlying determinants driving potential gender gaps in fintech 
knowledge is of utmost importance. Somewhat surprisingly, studies on fintech-re-
lated knowledge are markedly sparse and, even more importantly, gender differ-
ences in fintech-related knowledge have, to the best of our knowledge, hitherto not 
been investigated. 
Our study attempts to fill this gap by investigating potential gender differences 
in fintech knowledge and its underlying determinants with respect to the most 
prominent virtual currency: Bitcoin. To assess gender differences in ‘Bitcoin liter-
acy’, we merge data from seven nationally representative US surveys administered 
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by the Understanding America Study (UAS) covering more than 2,500 individual 
respondents. 
We contribute to the literature in multiple ways. First, we document a signifi-
cant gender gap in Bitcoin literacy in the US, indicating that women possess weaker 
knowledge regarding the characteristics of Bitcoin compared to men. Second, we 
find that socio-demographic variables as well as personality traits explain only a 
small share of the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy. As a third contribution, we test 
whether gender differences in financial literacy explain the gender gap in Bitcoin 
literacy. Our results suggest that adding measures for actual and perceived financial 
literacy helps to explain approximately 40 percent of the gender gap in Bitcoin 
literacy. Finally, we control for potential gender differences in digital technology 
exposure, because sensible usage of fintech products also requires individuals to 
have a profound understanding of recent digital technologies. While being strongly 
related to Bitcoin literacy, we do not find any significant gender differences in the 
exposure to digital technology, indicating that technological experience is not likely 
to be the reason for the observed gender gap in Bitcoin literacy. 
In general, our findings suggest that closing the gender gap in financial literacy 
might only serve as a partial remedy for closing the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy. 
More than half of the Bitcoin-literacy gender gap remains unexplained, even after 
controlling for technological experience. This finding raises serious concerns whether 
closing gender gaps in financial literacy will be enough to avoid diverging financial 
wealth levels due to the increasing use of financial technologies. 
2. Data and variable measurement 
To investigate a potential gender gap in Bitcoin literacy and its underlying 
determinants, we use data collected in the Understanding America Study (UAS), 
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which is a nationally representative household panel featuring a sample of approx-
imately 6,000 US respondents. The UAS consists of a diverse set of survey waves 
that are of strong scientific and policy interest, including questionnaires related to 
individuals’ financial literacy. A key feature of the UAS is that it allows us to link 
data across different surveys. We link data of seven different surveys that have 
been conducted between April 2015 and February 2018. All of our analyses are 
conducted using a sample of 2,533 individuals with non-missing values for all vari-
ables.1 Next to a large set of socio-demographic control variables, we use infor-
mation on individuals’ ‘BIG FIVE’ personality traits, as well as measures for actual 
and perceived financial literacy. Because understanding fintech-related products re-
quires understanding of financial concepts as well as of recent digital technology, 
we build a proxy variable to capture individuals’ knowledge of digital technology 
and argue that exposure to digital technology is likely to be associated with better 
understanding of such technology. The digital technology exposure index ranges 
from 0 to 3, capturing three technology-related characteristics: Occupation with a 
strong exposure to computer technology, owning a Twitter account, and adoption 
of online and mobile banking services.2 Table IV-1 reports the summary statistics 
of our sample. It shows the sample means of all explanatory variables, distinguish-
ing between women and men, and also reports the differences between the two 
groups. Table IV-1 confirms prior findings on gender gaps in actual and perceived 
financial literacy, indicating that women show both lower levels of actual and per-
ceived financial literacy. With regard to the digital technology exposure index, how-
ever, we find similar levels for women and men. 
                                      
1 We drop all observations with missing values in any of our variables to ease interpretation and to ensure 
comparability of the results of our decomposition analysis in Table IV-3. 
2 We classify occupations to have a strong exposure to information technology when the job title includes 
the word ‘computer’. For our classification, we follow the job code category listings in the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm). 
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Table IV-1: Summary statistics 
 Mean 
  
 All Women Men Diff. N 
Panel A: Sociodemographics 
Female 0.470    2,533 
Age 48.634 48.454 48.794 -0.339 2,533 
Married 0.620 0.528 0.701 -0.172*** 2,533 
Education      
College graduate 0.419 0.446 0.396 0.050* 2,533 
Some college 0.295 0.320 0.273 0.047* 2,533 
High school graduate 0.246 0.210 0.277 -0.067** 2,533 
Less than high school 0.040 0.024 0.054 -0.030** 2,533 
Race      
Asian 0.033 0.031 0.034 -0.003 2,533 
White 0.799 0.801 0.798 0.004 2,533 
Black 0.093 0.104 0.083 0.021 2,533 
Other 0.073 0.063 0.082 -0.020 2,533 
Born in the US 0.917 0.920 0.914 0.006 2,533 
Unemployed 0.036 0.043 0.030 0.013 2,533 
Retired 0.154 0.158 0.151 0.007 2,533 
Household income 122,811 118,030 127,044 -5,751 2,533 
Household net wealth 409,757 433,805 388,469 39,108 2,533 
Financial stress 0.416 0.475 0.363 0.112*** 2,533 
Political affiliation      
Democrats 0.375 0.425 0.331 0.095*** 2,533 
Republicans 0.326 0.294 0.355 -0.061** 2,533 
No political party 0.226 0.229 0.223 0.006 2,533 
Libertarian 0.041 0.031 0.050 -0.019* 2,533 
Green party 0.013 0.010 0.015 -0.005 2,533 
Other party 0.019 0.012 0.026 -0.015* 2,533 
Panel B:Personality traits 
Openness 36.581 36.273 36.854 -0.582 2,533 
Conscientiousness 36.886 36.911 36.864 0.047 2,533 
Extroversion 26.657 27.133 26.236 0.898** 2,533 
Agreeableness 35.915 36.686 35.231 1.455*** 2,533 
Neuroticism 20.805 21.622 20.081 1.542*** 2,533 
Panel C: Financial literacy and digital technology ex-
posure           
Perceived financial literacy 7.852 7.641 8.039 -0.397*** 2,533 
Actual financial literacy 10.113 9.559 10.603 -1.045*** 2,533 
Digital technology exposure 1.191 1.182 1.200 -0.018 2,533 
This table shows summary statistics of all explanatory variables used in our analysis, distinguishing between the subsam-
ple of women and men, respectively. The data is weighted and representative for the US population. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Our dependent variable ‘Bitcoin literacy’ is created from a set of six true-or-
false questions, each assessing respondents’ knowledge of a particular aspect of 
Bitcoin. The set of questions we use is similar, but not identical to the Bitcoin 
knowledge questions in the Bitcoin Omnibus Survey conducted by the Bank of 
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Canada (Henry, Huynh, and Nicholls, 2018). For each question, we build an indi-
cator variable that equals one if respondents answer the respective question cor-
rectly, and zero otherwise. The Bitcoin literacy index sums up the number of correct 
answers and ranges from 0 to 6, respectively.  
 
Table IV-2: Bitcoin literacy in the US 
 Mean 
  
 All Women Men Diff. N 
Panel A: Bitcoin literacy questions (% of respondents providing correct answer) 
No third party (true) 0.714 0.707 0.720 -0.013 2,533 
Recorded on public ledger (true) 0.183 0.173 0.192 -0.018 2,533 
Total supply fixed (true) 0.196 0.164 0.225 -0.061*** 2,533 
Government-insured (false) 0.982 0.978 0.985 -0.007 2,533 
Transfers irreversible (true) 0.164 0.114 0.208 -0.094*** 2,533 
Central repository (false) 0.774 0.763 0.784 -0.021 2,533 
Panel B: Bitcoin literacy index 
Bitcoin literacy index 3.013 2.899 3.114 -0.215*** 2,533 
This table reports summary statistics for Bitcoin literacy in the US, distinguishing between the subsample of female and 
male respondents, respectively. Panel A shows the fraction of respondents providing correct answers to each of the six 
named features of Bitcoin. Panel B shows summary statistics of our constructed Bitcoin literacy index, which is defined 
as the sum of correct answers to the Bitcoin literacy questions, ranging from 0 to 6 correct answers. We provide detailed 
variable descriptions in Appendix IV-1. The data is weighted and representative for the US population. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table IV-2 shows descriptive statistics of our Bitcoin literacy index and the set 
of underlying questions. We document a significant gender gap in Bitcoin literacy 
(Panel B of Table IV-2), indicating that women possess weaker knowledge regard-
ing the mechanisms underlying Bitcoin technology.3 For detailed variable descrip-
tions, please see Appendix IV-1. 
3. Empirical results 
To explain the documented gender gap in Bitcoin literacy, we decompose the 
difference in Bitcoin literacy between men and women by using a modified Blinder-
Oaxaca counterfactual decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). The Blinder-
                                      
3 We provide detailed multiple linear regressions featuring Bitcoin literacy as the dependent variable in 
Appendix IV-2. The results suggest that the gender gap persists even after including all available control 
variables. 
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Oaxaca-decomposition has been employed to explain gender differences in financial 
literacy (e.g., Cupák et al., 2018; Fonseca et al., 2012). In our study, we choose a 
twofold counterfactual decomposition approach of the following form: 
 
푌푀̅ − 푌푊̅ = (푋̅̅̅̅푀 − 푋̅̅̅̅푊 )′훽∗⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
푒푥푝푙푎푖푛푒푑
⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞
(퐼)
+ 푋̅̅̅̅′푀(훽푀 − 훽∗)
⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞
(퐼퐼)
+ 푋̅̅̅̅′푊 (훽∗ − 훽푊 )
⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞
(퐼퐼퐼)
⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
푢푛푒푥푝푙푎푖푛푒푑
  (1) 
 
where 푌푀̅ − 푌푊̅  denotes the outcome differential in Bitcoin literacy between the 
group of men (푀) and women (푊), and 푋 is a vector capturing individual char-
acteristics as well as a constant. 훽∗ denotes a coefficient vector estimated from a 
pooled regression over the two groups, and 훽푀  and 훽푊  are the coefficients obtained 
from separately regressing Bitcoin literacy on the individual characteristics for the 
groups of men and women, respectively. The twofold decomposition divides gender-
based differences in Bitcoin literacy into two parts. The first is the part of the 
gender gap that can be explained by differences in group characteristics, i.e. in 
predictors 푋 (I). The second denotes the unexplained part and captures effects of 
positive discrimination in favor of men (II) as well as negative discrimination 
against women (III) but also considers effects due to unobserved (omitted) variables 
(Jann, 2008). 
We report the results of various specifications of Equation (1) in Table IV-3. 
Specification (1) reports the unconditional gender gap in Bitcoin literacy excluding 
all other control variables 푋 from our regression model. Next, we stepwise add 
control variables to our model, in order to show how much of the gender gap can 
be explained by the differences in the group characteristics 푋. In doing so, we 
control for group differences in socio-demographics (specification (2)), personality 
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traits (specification (3)), and financial literacy (specification (4)). Finally, we con-
trol for group differences related to the exposure to digital technology (specification 
(5)). 
 
Table IV-3: Decomposing the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Explained 0.0000 0.0184 0.0474* 0.0914*** 0.0923*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0217) (0.0276) (0.0310) (0.0310) 
Unexplained 0.2147*** 0.1963*** 0.1673*** 0.1233** 0.1224** 
 (0.0561) (0.0550) (0.0559) (0.0567) (0.0565) 
Controls      
Sociodemographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personality traits No No Yes Yes Yes 
Financial literacy No No No Yes Yes 
Digital technology exposure No No No No Yes 
This table shows the results from a modified Blinder-Oaxaca counterfactual decomposition method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973) featuring Bitcoin literacy as the dependent variable. In specification (1), we report the unconditional gender gap in 
Bitcoin literacy excluding any control variables. Next, we assess how much of the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy can be 
explained by gender differences in socio-demographics (specification (2)), personality traits (specification (3)), actual and 
perceived financial literacy (specification (4)). Finally, in specification (5), we further control for gender differences in the 
exposure to digital technology. The unexplained part captures the proportion of the gender gap that cannot be explained 
by the included variables. We provide detailed variable descriptions in Appendix IV-1. The data is weighted and repre-
sentative for the US population. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Figure IV-1 provides a graphical illustration of the decomposition results of Ta-
ble IV-3 and reports the explained and unexplained parts of the total gender gap 
in Bitcoin literacy for the different specifications, expressed as a percentage. 
The results in specification (1) show that the outcome differential in Bitcoin 
literacy is statistically and economically significant, indicating that women’s 
Bitcoin literacy index is 0.2147 lower than men’s.4 This translates into a gender gap 
of 7.1% when referring to the sample mean of Bitcoin literacy (3.013). While socio-
demographic variables and personality traits do help to explain the gender gap in 
Bitcoin literacy (specifications (2) and (3)), their additional explanatory power is 
only small. Adding measures for actual and perceived financial literacy in specifi-
cation (4) helps to explain up to 42.6 % of the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy. The 
                                      
4 This finding is in line with the results provided in Panel B of Table IV-2. 
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valued added by including the digital technology exposure index, in contrast, is 
negligible, indicating that the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy is unlikely to stem 
from gender differences in experience with digital technologies. 
 
Figure IV-1: Decomposing the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy 
 
 
 
This figure provides a graphical illustration of the decomposition results analogously to the results from specifications (1) 
to (5) in Table IV-3. In specification (1), we report the unconditional gender gap in Bitcoin literacy excluding any control 
variables. Next, we assess how much of the gender gap in Bitcoin literacy can be explained by gender differences in socio-
demographics (specification (2)), personality traits (specification (3)), actual and perceived financial literacy (specification 
(4)). Finally, in specification (5), we further control for gender differences in the exposure to digital technology. The 
unexplained part captures the fraction of the gender gap expressed as a percentage that cannot be explained by gender 
disparities in the included variables. We calculate the percentage values by dividing the unexplained part by the sample 
mean of Bitcoin literacy (see Panel B of Table IV-2). The data is weighted and representative for the US population. 
Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Using nationally representative US data, we report a significant gender gap in 
Bitcoin literacy and examine its determinants. Our results suggest that socio-de-
mographic variables and personality traits only explain a small fraction of the gen-
der gap. Adding measures for actual and perceived financial literacy allows to ex-
plain about 40 percent of the Bitcoin-literacy gender gap. We also assess whether 
disparities in individuals’ exposure to digital technology exhibit explanatory power 
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on the Bitcoin-literacy gender gap. This does not turn out to be the case. Our 
results emphasize that closing gender gaps in financial literacy is certainly relevant 
but not sufficient to eliminate gender disparities in fintech-related knowledge. 
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6. Appendix 
Appendix IV-1: Variable descriptions 
Name Description UAS survey 
Panel A: Control variables 
Actual financial literacy Ordinal variable measuring the number of correct answers to 14 financial 
literacy questions. For the specific wording of the financial literacy ques-
tions, please refer to https://uasdata.usc.edu/index.php. 
1 
Age Ordinal variable measuring respondent’s age. General 
Born in the US Dummy = 1 if respondent is born in the US, and zero otherwise General 
Digital technology exposure Ordinal variable measuring an individual’s exposure to digital technology 
ranging from 0 to 3. The index is the sum of three dummy variables, cap-
turing the following items: Occupation with strong exposure to computer 
technology, owning a Twitter account, and adoption of mobile and online 
banking services. 
2, 18, 88 
Education Different dummy variables capturing respondent’s educational level (ei-
ther no high school, high school, some college or college). 
General 
Female Dummy = 1 if respondent is female, and zero otherwise General 
Financial stress Dummy = 1 for individuals that experienced major financial stress during 
the last three years, zero otherwise. 
18 
Household income Continuous variable measuring household’s yearly net income ($US). 24 
Household net wealth Continuous variable measuring household’s total net wealth ($US). 24 
Married Dummy = 1 if respondent is married, and zero otherwise. General 
Perceived financial literacy Ordinal variable measuring respondent’s confidence in the ability to make 
financial decisions on a scale from 0 to 10 (highest confidence). 
38 
Personality traits Ordinal variables measuring the Big Five personality traits: openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. For the 
items included in our measure, please see https://uasdata.usc.edu/in-
dex.php/. 
1 
Political affiliation Different dummy variables capturing respondent’s political affiliation (ei-
ther Democrats, Republicans, No political party, Libertarian, Green party 
or other party). 
117 
Race Different dummy variables capturing respondent’s race (either Asian, 
White, Black or other). 
General 
Retired Dummy = 1 if respondent is retired, and zero otherwise. 38 
Unemployed Dummy =1 if respondent is unemployed, and zero otherwise. 38 
Panel B: Bitcoin literacy questions and index 
No third party Dummy = 1 if the following question is correctly answered, and zero oth-
erwise. Question: Bitcoin allows for direct transactions between two par-
ties without a third party involved (true). 
117 
Recorded on public ledger Dummy = 1 if the following question is correctly answered, and zero oth-
erwise. Question: All Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a distributed 
ledger that is publicly accessible (true). 
117 
Total supply fixed Dummy = 1 if the following question is correctly answered, and zero oth-
erwise. 
Question: The total supply of Bitcoin is fixed (true). 
117 
Government-insured Dummy = 1 if the following question is correctly answered, and zero oth-
erwise. Question: Bitcoin holdings are insured by the government (false). 
117 
Transfers irreversible Dummy = 1 if the following question is correctly answered, and zero oth-
erwise. Question: Bitcoin transfers are irreversible (true). 
117 
Central repository Dummy = 1 if the following question is correctly answered, and zero oth-
erwise. Question: All bitcoin transactions go through a central repository 
(false). 
117 
Bitcoin literacy index Ordinal variable measuring the number of correct answers to the 6 Bitcoin 
literacy questions. 
117 
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Appendix IV-2: Determinants of Bitcoin literacy 
Dependent variable: Bitcoin literacy index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.2147*** -0.1963*** -0.1673*** -0.1233** -0.1224** 
 (0.0561) (0.0554) (0.0561) (0.0570) (0.0570) 
Perceived financial literacy    0.0265* 0.0237 
    (0.0151) (0.0150) 
Actual financial literacy    0.0376*** 0.0351*** 
    (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Digital technology exposure     0.0915** 
     (0.0395) 
Age  -0.0311*** -0.0284*** -0.0311*** -0.0307*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Age2  0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0002** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  0.0393 0.0573 0.0430 0.0376 
  (0.0672) (0.0674) (0.0668) (0.0668) 
College graduate  0.1867 0.1795 0.0851 0.0525 
  (0.1452) (0.1450) (0.1466) (0.1495) 
Some college  -0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0542 -0.0711 
  (0.1451) (0.1441) (0.1459) (0.1478) 
High school graduate  -0.0515 -0.0329 -0.0454 -0.0551 
  (0.1505) (0.1490) (0.1513) (0.1530) 
Asian  0.0778 0.0677 0.0523 0.0544 
  (0.2059) (0.2032) (0.2042) (0.2036) 
White  -0.0760 -0.0622 -0.0858 -0.0785 
  (0.1170) (0.1175) (0.1177) (0.1187) 
Black  0.0299 0.0572 0.0582 0.0387 
  (0.1461) (0.1483) (0.1478) (0.1479) 
Born in the US  -0.2419* -0.2512* -0.2365* -0.2364* 
  (0.1407) (0.1396) (0.1376) (0.1383) 
Unemployed  -0.0103 -0.0265 0.0033 -0.0074 
  (0.1427) (0.1456) (0.1411) (0.1450) 
Retired  0.0235 0.0218 0.0000 0.0020 
  (0.0932) (0.0927) (0.0916) (0.0908) 
Income Q2  -0.0958 -0.0850 -0.1004 -0.1049 
  (0.0871) (0.0878) (0.0892) (0.0897) 
Income Q3  -0.0660 -0.0504 -0.0736 -0.0839 
  (0.0887) (0.0893) (0.0904) (0.0907) 
Income Q4  0.1310 0.1320 0.0922 0.0736 
  (0.0937) (0.0942) (0.0963) (0.0966) 
Net wealth Q2  0.2155** 0.2244*** 0.1956** 0.1947** 
  (0.0854) (0.0857) (0.0854) (0.0853) 
Net wealth Q3  0.1404 0.1489* 0.0938 0.0915 
  (0.0902) (0.0902) (0.0899) (0.0892) 
Net wealth Q4  0.2017** 0.2139** 0.1494 0.1463 
  (0.0943) (0.0945) (0.0969) (0.0963) 
Financial stress  0.0082 -0.0067 -0.0011 -0.0080 
  (0.0587) (0.0598) (0.0592) (0.0592) 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix IV-2: Determinants of Bitcoin literacy - continued 
Dependent variable: Bitcoin literacy index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Democrats  -0.0390 -0.0338 -0.0258 -0.0317 
  (0.0757) (0.0758) (0.0748) (0.0747) 
Republicans  0.0261 0.0513 0.0465 0.0384 
  (0.0756) (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0762) 
Libertarian  0.1707 0.1839 0.1698 0.1591 
  (0.1660) (0.1650) (0.1637) (0.1626) 
Green party  0.5116*** 0.4797** 0.4606*** 0.4436*** 
  (0.1894) (0.1874) (0.1772) (0.1702) 
Other party  0.2813 0.2728 0.3169 0.3422 
    (0.2285) (0.2230) (0.2207) (0.2188) 
Openness   0.0092* 0.0078* 0.0073 
   (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Conscientiousness   -0.0116* -0.0130** -0.0122** 
   (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Extroversion   -0.0068 -0.0066 -0.0067 
   (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Agreeableness   -0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0032 
   (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0055) 
Neuroticism   -0.0036 -0.0019 -0.0021 
   (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Observations 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,533 2,533 
R2 0.0120 0.0762 0.0829 0.0926 0.0961 
This table presents the results from a series of linear regressions featuring bitcoin literacy as the dependent variable. In 
specification (1), we report the unconditional effect of being female on Bitcoin literacy. Next, we stepwise add socio-
demographic controls (specification (2)), personality traits (specification (3)) as well as measures for financial literacy 
(specification (4)). Finally, in specification (5), we further add the digital technology exposure model as an explanatory 
variable to our model. We provide detailed variable descriptions in Table A1 in the appendix. The data is weighted and 
representative for the US population. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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level, we provide evidence of a strong negative association between 
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cial well-being. We show that this effect is homogenous among the 
population and mainly stems from victimization in terms of mis-
representation of information as well as misusage of money by third 
parties. We disentangle two potential channels through which vic-
timization might reduce perceived financial well-being: psycholog-
ical consequences (confidence loss in financial matters) and eco-
nomic consequences (decreases in net wealth). Our results show 
that fraud is more negatively associated with a loss in one’s own 
confidence in financial matters than with declines in individuals’ 
net worth. Our findings suggest that victims might doubt their 
own abilities to handle financial matters, bearing substantial con-
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1. Introduction 
Recent research has shown that financial well-being is a key predictor of overall 
happiness (Netemeyer et al., 2017) and the OECD declares sustained financial well-
being as the ultimate goal of all their financial education efforts (INFE, 2011). Low 
levels of financial well-being can have severe negative consequences both on indi-
vidual and societal level. On individual level, a decline in financial well-being is 
associated with an increased probability of experiencing material hardship and 
struggling to make ends meet (CFPB, 2017b). On societal level, low financial well-
being is related to declines in overall consumption and more reliance on social sup-
port (Brüggen et al., 2017). At the same time, financial well-being is strongly related 
to the level of poverty in a society (e.g., Griggs, 2013) as well as to the economic 
growth of a society (Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers, 2012).1 
Given such wide-ranging negative consequences, researchers and policymakers 
have put in great effort to uncover underlying determinants of individuals’ financial 
well-being. For instance, studies show that financial well-being is associated with 
contextual factors (e.g., technological development), interventions (e.g., nudging 
and framing) as well as personal factors (Brüggen et al., 2017). Such personal fac-
tors include socio-demographics and personality traits but also so called ‘life events’ 
(e.g., losing a job or getting divorced), which are likely to have strong impact on 
individuals’ financial well-being (Brüggen et al., 2017; Luhmann et al., 2012). Some-
what surprisingly, studies analyzing the relationship between (negative) life events 
and individuals’ financial well-being are markedly sparse. 
                                      
1 Sacks et al. (2012) use data from the Eurobarometer survey and document a positive relationship between 
financial well-being and economic growth in 8 out of 9 countries. 
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Our study attempts to fill this gap by investigating a previously unconsidered 
negative life event – becoming a victim of consumer fraud – and its effect on in-
dividuals’ perception of financial well-being. In contrast to individuals’ actual fi-
nancial well-being, perceived financial well-being does not only reflect individuals’ 
level of comfort in meeting financial obligations, but also individuals’ perception 
about having a feeling of financial security (e.g., CFPB, 2015, 2017a; Netemeyer et 
al., 2017). 
In our study, we relate consumer fraud to any fraudulent financial transactions, 
in which individuals feel that they have been financially taken advantage of, in-
cluding being sold unsuitable products, being a victim of misrepresentation of in-
formation (e.g., hidden fees or unclear transaction terms), but also experiencing 
misusage of money by third parties (e.g., embezzlement of investments). Thus, con-
sumer fraud is not limited to financial misconduct committed by investment advi-
sors (e.g., Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham, 2018), but also entails any intentional 
deceptions in terms of fraudulent offerings of goods and services (Titus, 2001). Con-
sumer fraud, broadly defined, is a global and wide-spread phenomenon with inter-
national fraud prevalence rates of approximately 11% (van Dijk, van Kesteren, and 
Smit, 2007). Among the US population, more than 10% are being victimized by 
consumer fraud every year (K. B. Anderson, 2013) and the number of consumer 
complaints regarding fraudulent activities reported to the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau increased by 82% between 2015 and 2017 (CFPB, 2018). 
We hypothesize that being victimized by consumer fraud might have a large 
impact on how individuals evaluate their financial situation, both in monetary 
terms, but also with regard to their feeling of financial security. Our hypothesis is 
based on findings in the literature providing evidence that consumer fraud victims 
often suffer from a multitude of negative consequences. Despite the direct monetary 
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costs incurred by victimization that are estimated to range from approximately $40 
to $50 billion (Deevy, Lucich, and Beals, 2012), there is ample evidence that vic-
timization is also associated with indirect costs. For instance, prior studies show 
that victims of fraud often suffer from psychological problems, including sleep dep-
rivation, depression and even suicidal ideation (e.g., Ganzini, Mcfarland, and Bloom, 
1990; Sechrest et al., 1998). More importantly, such indirect costs often outweigh 
the direct costs of victimization (Kieffer and Mottola, 2016). 
Against this background, theory suggests that individuals who have not been 
victimized by negative life events, such as fraud, tend to perceive themselves as 
rather personally invulnerable (Perloff, 1983).2 However, once an individual experi-
ences victimization this feeling of personal invulnerability is strongly shattered (e.g., 
Aihio et al., 2017; Denkers and Winkel, 1998; Perloff, 1983; Spalek, 1999). In the 
context of our study, we argue that consumer fraud victimization might shatter the 
feeling of individuals’ financial security – a key component of individuals’ per-
ceived financial well-being. Hence, we expect that, in contrast to non-victims that 
still tend to perceive themselves as rather personally invulnerable, fraud victims 
exhibit lower levels of financial well-being. 
To test our hypothesis, we merge data from seven nationally representative 
surveys administered by the Understanding America Study (UAS). Our detailed 
data allows us to investigate whether and how the effect of consumer fraud victim-
ization on financial well-being varies among subgroups of individuals and different 
types of fraud. 
Our contribution to the literature is fourfold. First, we show that consumer 
fraud victimization is negatively associated with individuals’ perception of financial 
                                      
2 Individuals’ excessive feeling of invulnerability is also well documented in Taylor and Brown (1988) and 
Weinstein (1980). 
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well-being. Second, we show that victimization exhibits homogenous detrimental 
effects on financial well-being among virtually all subgroups of individuals (e.g., 
different income and educational levels). Thus, our findings support the notion that 
the negative impact of consumer fraud victimization on financial well-being is a 
population-wide phenomenon. In our third contribution, we show that the negative 
effect of consumer fraud victimization mainly stems from two consumer fraud vic-
timization types: Fraud in terms of misrepresentation of information as well as 
misusage of money by third parties. Fourth and finally, we disentangle potential 
channels through which consumer fraud victimization might alter individuals’ per-
ceived financial well-being: one’s own confidence in financial matters and total net 
wealth. Our results show that while fraud is negatively associated with one’s own 
confidence in financial matters, we do not find evidence in favor of an significant 
effect on individuals’ net worth. This result reveals that victimized individuals seem 
to doubt their own financial abilities, which is likely to translate to lower levels of 
perceived financial well-being.3 
We conduct several robustness checks, including a propensity matching analysis 
to control for a potential selection bias caused by factors such as differing age or 
wealth levels, which can possibly impact the likelihood of becoming a fraud victim 
(e.g., Lee and Soberon-Ferrer, 1997). More importantly, we thoroughly address con-
cerns regarding potential endogeneity of consumer fraud victimization by means of 
an instrumental variable regression. 
                                      
3 Confidence in financial matters is found to be a vital part in sound financial decision-making, especially 
in terms of retirement planning (Anderson, Baker, and Robinson, 2017; Parker et al., 2012), investments in 
risky financial assets or savings products (Bannier and Neubert, 2016; Tang and Baker, 2016), as well as 
handling of mortgages or loans (Allgood and Walstad, 2016; Farrell, Fry, and Risse, 2016). Thus, studies 
provide some evidence that losing part of confidence in one’s own financial abilities will tremendously harm 
individuals’ financial well-being. 
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Our study intersects literature of research fields in criminology, psychology and 
economics. While recent studies regarding fraud have mainly focused on the of-
fender-side identifying reasons why financial fraud is committed (e.g., Andersen, 
Hanspal, and Nielsen, 2018a; Dimmock et al., 2018) and if so, where fraud geo-
graphically happens (Egan, Matvos, and Seru, 2018; Parsons, Sulaeman, and Tit-
man, 2018), our study puts the spotlight on the victim-side of fraud and its severe 
consequences. Literature provides ample evidence that severe negative past experi-
ences have a considerable impact on individuals’ financial decisions, including indi-
viduals’ risk taking behavior and stock market participation (e.g., Andersen, 
Hanspal, and Nielsen, 2018b; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). In this context, studies 
show that exposure to consumer fraud victimization on state and community level 
is associated with a considerable loss in individuals’ trust in financial institutions 
(e.g., Giannetti and Wang, 2016; Gurun, Stoffman, and Yonker, 2018). This loss in 
trust is likely to affect individuals’ financial well-being, because less trusting indi-
viduals reduce their investments in risky assets in favor of deposits, which fail to 
generate positive inflation-adjusted returns (Gurun et al., 2018). As another wide-
ranging consequence of fraud, Titus et al. (1995) report that 20% of consumer fraud 
victims personally suffer from financial or personal credit problems. Further, studies 
provide evidence that consumer fraud victimization is associated with psychological 
consequences that range from anger and disappointment amongst victims (Shichor, 
Sechrest, and Doocy, 2000) even to relationship-and marital problems (Button, 
Lewis, and Tapley, 2014). Likewise, becoming a victim of fraud is often followed by 
stress, depressions and health issues (FINRA, 2015), which often result in a lasting 
decrease in life-satisfaction (Staubli, Killias, and Frey, 2014). We contribute to the 
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literature and show that consumer fraud victimization is associated with a consid-
erable decline in one’s own confidence in financial matters, which can have severe 
impact on individuals’ financial well-being. 
2. Data and variable measurement 
2.1. Sample collection 
To assess the relationship between consumer fraud victimization and financial 
well-being, we use data collected in the Understanding America Study (UAS). The 
UAS is a nationally representative household panel recruited by the University of 
Southern California, featuring a sample of approximately 6,000 US respondents. In 
general, the UAS consists of a diverse set of survey waves (around 150 different 
surveys), covering numerous aspects, such as financial literacy, psychological atti-
tudes, financial well-being and financial behavior. A key feature of the UAS is that 
it allows us to uniquely identify individuals across different surveys. The data we 
use were collected between April 2015 and August 2018. All surveys include time 
stamps featuring information on the date when a particular survey was taken. We 
exploit this information to partially mitigate concerns regarding reverse causality 
and drop respondents that completed the survey on financial well-being (UAS 38), 
before responding to the survey on consumer fraud victimization (UAS 18), result-
ing in a final sample of 4,857 individuals. 
2.2. Measuring financial well-being 
For our dependent variable, we use the Financial Well-Being Scale recently in-
troduced by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, 2017a). The CFPB 
defines financial well-being as “a state of being wherein a person can fully meet 
current and ongoing financial obligations, can feel secure in their financial future, 
and is able to make choices that allow them to enjoy life” (CFPB, 2017a, p. 6). To 
assess individuals’ financial well-being (퐹푊퐵) respondents are asked to evaluate 
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how well and how often 10 different statements and situations with regard to fi-
nancial matters apply to them.4 For instance, respondents were asked how well the 
statement “I am securing my financial future” describes their financial situation, 
with possible answers ranging from “4 = Describes me completely to 0 = Does not 
describe me at all”. Another item asks respondents how often the statement “I have 
money left over at the end of the month” applies to them, with possible answers 
coded from “4 = Always to 0 = Never”.5 Respondents’ answers to the 10-item 
questionnaire are then summed to an aggregate financial well-being score that can 
take on values ranging from 0 to 40, with higher values indicating higher levels of 
financial well-being. Instead of using the aggregate financial well-being score, we 
use a scoring procedure developed by the CFPB, which accounts for variations by 
item polarity, age group of respondent, and administration mode (self-administered 
vs. interviewer administered), resulting in a more precise score for each individual.6 
This score is captured in 퐹푊퐵 and can take on values between 0 and 100 and is 
centered at 50, with higher values indicating higher levels of financial well-being.7 
We use this score in all of our main analyses and provide detailed descriptions as 
well as summary statistics of each item in Appendix V-2. 
2.3. Measurement of consumer fraud victimization 
To create a measure for consumer fraud victimization, we utilize a specific sur-
vey module available in UAS 18 that comprises in-depth information on individuals’ 
                                      
4 Please see Kahneman and Krueger (2006) for a discussion on the importance and measurement of sub-
jective well-being in the context of surveys and self-reported data. 
5 Please note that six out of ten questions are reverse coded. For the reverse coded items, the categories 
“does not describe me at all” as well as “never” receive the highest value of four. We mark all reverse coded 
items in Appendix V-2. 
6 The method introduced by the CFPB accounts for item polarity, which tests whether the direction of 
the items (either negatively or positively worded) might have influenced individuals’ responses. 
7 For a detailed description on the development of the CFPB Financial Well-Being Scale and the item 
response theory model employed, the reader is referred to the technical report of the CFPB (CFPB, 2017a). 
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consumer fraud victimization. To identify consumer fraud victims, we use the fol-
lowing survey item: 
Do you feel like you have been taken advantage of on a major financial 
transaction in the last 3 years? Major means at least $1,000. 
We build an indicator variable Fraud that equals one for respondents answering 
“yes” to this question (consumer fraud victims), and zero otherwise (non-victims). 
A key feature of our data is that respondents were further asked in what ways they 
were financially taken advantage of, which allows us to differentiate between vari-
ous types of fraud. Respondents can choose different types of fraud that apply to 
them. For our analysis of fraud types, we differentiate between fraud regarding 
unsuitable products (e.g., products sold that were not requested), misrepresentation 
of information (e.g., hidden fees), misusage of money by third parties (e.g., embez-
zlement of investments), and other types of fraud. For each of the four preceding 
fraud types, we build an indicator variable that equals one if the respondent reports 
the respective fraud type, and zero otherwise.8 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
In Table V-1, we report summary statistics for our explanatory variables 
(Panel A) as well as our dependent variable, the CFPB Financial Well-Being Scale 
(Panel B). Throughout our analyses, we include a large set of control variables that 
have been previously identified to affect financial well-being (see e.g., Brüggen et 
al., 2017). For instance, we include measures for respondents’ financial literacy and 
confidence in financial matters (CFPB, 2017b), as well as whether the respondent 
                                      
8 Please note that respondents can choose multiple fraud types, indicating that they might report fraud 
types of more than one group at the same time. For detailed descriptions on the fraud items, please refer to 
Appendix V-1. We further conduct some data cleansing steps to reduce potential measurement error in the 
variable Fraud. For detailed description of this procedure, we refer to Appendix V-3. 
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consulted a professional financial advisor for investment advice (Gerrans, Speelman, 
and Campitelli, 2014). 
 
Table V-1: Sample characteristics 
US population 
  Mean SD Min. Median Max. N 
Panel A. Controls             
Financial literacy 9.147 3.133 0 9 14 4,836 
Cognitive ability 3.431 1.942 0 3 8 4,857 
Confidence 7.561 2.123 0 8 10 4,836 
Trust 4.153 1.037 1 4 5 4,829 
Emotional stability 3.746 1.151 1 4 5 4,832 
Risk attitude 5.768 2.319 0 6 10 4,798 
Investment advice 0.214 0.410 0 0 1 4,857 
Female 0.527 0.499 0 1 1 4,857 
Age 47.827 16.257 18 47 107 4,853 
Married 0.560 0.496 0 1 1 4,857 
Children 0.725 0.447 0 1 1 4,857 
Ethnicity       
White 0.759 0.427 0 1 1 4,847 
Black 0.131 0.338 0 0 1 4,847 
Asian 0.027 0.162 0 0 1 4,847 
Other 0.082 0.275 0 0 1 4,847 
Education 1.230 0.623 0 1 3 4,770 
Unemployed 0.056 0.230 0 0 1 4,857 
Self-employed 0.067 0.249 0 0 1 4,857 
Household income 105,367 142,318 0 71,284 2,604,000 4,672 
Household net wealth 309,345 1,413,769 -6,875,099 54,048 81,450,000 4,833 
Panel B. Financial well-being 
Financial well-being 54.228 12.622 14 54 95 4,823 
This table reports summary statistics on variables used in our analysis. We provide detailed variable descriptions in 
Appendix V-1. The data is weighted and representative for the US population. 
 
Furthermore, we include a comprehensive set of socio-demographic characteris-
tics, including individuals’ general trust, gender, age, marital status, having chil-
dren, ethnicity, education, labor market status, household income and net wealth. 
We also control for individuals’ risk attitude, emotional stability and cognitive abil-
ity, because those variables been shown to be strongly related to individuals’ finan-
cial situation (e.g., Calvet and Sodini, 2014; Côté, Gyurak, and Levenson, 2010; 
Dohmen et al., 2011; Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai, 2012; McArdle, Smith, 
and Willis, 2009). In Panel B of Table V-1, we report summary statistics of our 
dependent variable financial well-being. The mean (median) financial well-being 
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score equals 54.2 (54), indicating that financial well-being of respondents in our 
sample is slightly higher than for the average respondent in the US population. For 
detailed variable descriptions, please see Appendix V-1. Subsequently, we provide 
the summary statistics of our main explanatory variable consumer fraud victimiza-
tion and its underlying dimensions in Table V-2. 
 
Table V-2: Consumer fraud victimization among US households 
US population (N = 4,837) 
  Mean 
Fraud 0.107 
0.021 
0.085 
0.019 
0.004 
Unsuitable products 
Misrepresentation of information 
Misusage of money by third parties 
Other 
This table reports summary statistics on our main explanatory variable Fraud and its different categories and shows the 
fraction of US individuals reporting each type of consumer fraud victimization. We provide detailed variable descriptions 
in Appendix V-1. The data is weighted and representative for the US population. 
 
Table V-2 shows that 10.7 percent of the population reports to be victimized by 
consumer fraud in the past three years, which is in line with findings in the 2011 
Consumer Fraud in the United States Survey conducted by the Federal Trade 
Commission (K. B. Anderson, 2013). We document that misrepresentation of in-
formation seems to be the most prominent form of fraud with 8.5 percent of the 
population reporting victimization.9 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Consumer fraud victimization and financial well-being 
3.1.1. Main results 
To examine the impact of consumer fraud victimization on individuals’ financial 
well-being, we estimate the following linear regression model 
                                      
9 In unreported analyses, we also assess who is being victimized by fraud. Our results are consistent with 
DeLiema et al. (2018) and Titus et al. (1995), who show that there is neither a single personal factor nor a 
typical stereotype that reliably predicts fraud victimization. 
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퐹푊퐵푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹푟푎푢푑푖 + 훾′풄푖 + 휀푖    (1) 
where 퐹푊퐵푖 denotes respondent 푖`s financial well-being, and 퐹푟푎푢푑 is an indi-
cator variable that equals one for consumer fraud victims, and zero otherwise. We 
supplement our regression model with a vector of control variables 풄푖, capturing all 
variables displayed in Panel A of Table V-1. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table V-3 report coefficient estimates obtained from 
two specifications of Equation (1). In column (1), we report the unconditional effect 
of consumer fraud victimization on financial well-being excluding all other control 
variables from our model. The coefficient of Fraud reveals a statistically significant 
negative effect of consumer fraud victimization on individuals’ financial well-being 
that amounts to -6.5. In other words, being victimized by consumer fraud reduces 
individuals’ financial well-being by approximately 12 percent according to a sample 
mean of financial well-being of 54.2.10 In specification (2), we add the vector of 
control variables 풄푖 to our regression model. While the effect of consumer fraud 
victimization decreases in magnitude, the results in specification (2) still provide 
strong evidence in support of a statistically and economically significant impact of 
consumer fraud victimization on financial well-being. More precisely, in our baseline 
model in specification (2), we document that being victimized by fraud is associated 
with a decrease in individuals’ financial well-being of -4.7 (or 8.7 percent) after 
controlling for a large set of factors that have been previously identified to explain 
variation in financial well-being. 
  
                                      
10 In unreported analysis, we also estimated the regression model in equation (1) using the aggregated 
financial well-being score ranging from 0 to 40 as outlined in section 2.2. Results are robust to using this 
alternative measure of financial well-being and are available upon request. 
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Table V-3: Consumer fraud victimization and financial well-being 
Dependent variable: Financial well-being (FWB) 
 OLS Instrumental variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Fraud -6.5292*** -4.6650*** -4.1445*** 
 (0.8034) (0.7223) (1.5273) 
Financial literacy  0.4358*** 0.3937*** 
  (0.1003) (0.0981) 
Cognitive ability  0.1025 0.1019 
  (0.1423) (0.1444) 
Confidence  1.2435*** 1.2755*** 
  (0.1371) (0.1338) 
Trust  -0.1141 -0.1777 
  (0.2337) (0.2285) 
Emotional stability  0.8898*** 0.9313*** 
  (0.2165) (0.2106) 
Risk attitude  0.3251*** 0.3407*** 
  (0.1103) (0.1068) 
Investment advice  1.3514** 1.3401** 
  (0.5495) (0.5339) 
Female  0.2623 0.3318 
  (0.4622) (0.4506) 
Age 30 to 40  -2.4651*** -2.3879*** 
  (0.7364) (0.7257) 
Age 40 to 50  -4.0391*** -4.2000*** 
  (0.7716) (0.7550) 
Age 50 to 60  -3.5154*** -3.4742*** 
  (0.7509) (0.7316) 
Age above 60  0.0909 0.3595 
  (0.7839) (0.7697) 
Married  0.6536 0.4808 
  (0.5061) (0.4876) 
Children  -0.9164 -1.0688* 
  (0.5728) (0.5635) 
White  -0.1189 0.0049 
  (0.9246) (0.9006) 
Black  1.3428 1.0923 
  (1.1094) (1.0830) 
Asian  0.1840 0.0763 
  (1.3314) (1.2973) 
Education  0.7143* 0.6781* 
  (0.4215) (0.4030) 
Unemployed  -3.3692*** -3.6776*** 
  (0.9652) (0.9237) 
Self-employed  -0.6897 -0.7567 
  (0.7705) (0.7088) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table V-3: Consumer fraud victimization and financial well-being - continued 
Dependent variable: Financial well-being (FWB) 
 OLS Instrumental variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Income Q2  0.5967 0.7501 
  (0.6726) (0.6597) 
Income Q3  2.0993*** 2.3012*** 
  (0.6945) (0.6801) 
Income Q4  3.0523*** 3.3762*** 
  (0.7810) (0.7633) 
Household net wealth Q2  0.8122 0.9371 
  (0.6778) (0.6690) 
Household net wealth Q3  4.2239*** 4.1430*** 
  (0.6833) (0.6824) 
Household net wealth Q4  9.0727*** 9.0036*** 
  (0.8460) (0.8283) 
N 4,804 4,447 4,447 
R2 0.026 0.374 0.373 
F-statistic first-stage regression   9.505 
Endogeneity test (p-value)   0.863 
Specification (1) and (2) of this table report coefficient estimates obtained from a linear regression model of the generic 
form 
퐹푊퐵푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹푟푎푢푑푖 + 훾′풄푖 + 휀푖. 
Specification (1) shows the unconditional effect of Fraud on individuals i’s financial well-being (FWB), excluding all 
control variables 풄푖. Specification (2) shows the conditional effect of Fraud on FWB including control variables 풄푖. In 
specification (3), we provide the second stage IV estimates from an instrumental variable regression of financial well-being 
on Fraud and all control variables from our baseline specification in column (2) of Table V-3 using generated instruments 
after Lewbel (2012). We provide detailed variable descriptions in Appendix V-1. Tailor linearized standard errors are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p-values of p<.01, p<.05, and p<.10 respectively. 
 
With respect to the remaining regressors, we confirm prior findings in the liter-
ature that financially literate and individuals with higher confidence with regard to 
financial matters show higher levels of financial well-being (CFPB, 2017b). Moreo-
ver, we document that financial well-being increases with higher levels of emotional 
stability and higher levels of risk attitude and is higher for individuals that received 
investment advice. With regard to emotional stability, our findings are confirmed 
by Côté et al. (2010) who find a close link between controlled emotions and well-
being and financial success. With respect to risk taking and financial advice, studies 
have shown that both, risk taking (e.g., Dimmock et al., 2016; Kapteyn and Teppa, 
2011) and financial advice (Shum and Faig, 2006) are positively correlated with 
stock market participation, which enables individuals to participate in the equity 
BRENNER et al.  Consumer fraud victimization and financial well-being 
 
V-104 
 
premium, resulting in an improved financial situation (Campbell, 2006). With re-
gard to age, we find that younger individuals report higher levels of financial well-
being than the elderly. Not surprisingly, we also find unemployment to decrease, 
and higher income and net wealth to increase financial well-being. 
Finally, in specification (3), we attempt to address potential endogeneity issues 
that could distort the observed effects between consumer fraud victimization and 
financial well-being. In our cross-sectional survey setting, endogeneity of consumer 
fraud victimization could potentially occur either due to reverse causality or the 
omission of relevant (confounding) variables that are both correlated with consumer 
fraud victimization and financial well-being. Although we control for a large set of 
variables, one possible omitted variable that could bias our results is individuals’ 
lack of self-control, which is reflected in impulsive behavior and short-sightedness. 
In this regard, studies have shown that a lack of self-control is associated with a 
higher propensity of being victimized by fraud (e.g., Holtfreter et al., 2010; Reisig 
and Holtfreter, 2013). Likewise, a lack of self-control has also been shown to affect 
individuals’ financial well-being, for example, in terms of unfavorable debt decisions 
(e.g., Gathergood, 2012). Because we cannot directly observe individuals’ self-con-
trol, the omission of individuals’ self-control in our baseline linear regression model 
could lead to either under- or overestimation of the effect of consumer fraud vic-
timization on financial well-being. In order to control for endogeneity problems 
arising from both reverse causality and omitted variable bias, we resort to an in-
strumental variable regression approach using generated instruments after Lewbel 
(2012). We choose this approach because we lack appropriate external instrumental 
variables that would satisfy the exclusion restriction. Fortunately, the method in-
troduced in Lewbel (2012) does not rely on the validity of external instruments, 
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such as in standard IV regressions, but exploits variations in higher moment con-
ditions of the error distribution from a first-stage regression of consumer fraud vic-
timization on covariates to achieve identification. However, the model only gener-
ates valid instruments that can be used for identification if the error term of the 
first-stage regression is heteroscedastic. We test for this assumption by performing 
both a White test and a Breusch-Pagan test, as recommended by prior literature 
(e.g., Bannier and Schwarz, 2018; Deuflhard, Georgarakos, and Inderst, 2018; Meyll 
and Walter, 2019). Both tests suggest that the error term of the first-stage regres-
sion is heteroscedastic, allowing us to make use of the generated instruments after 
Lewbel (2012).11 We generate instruments by multiplying the residuals from the 
first-stage regression with each of the covariates, centered at their sample means. 
In column (3) of Table V-3, we report the second-stage estimates of this approach 
using the same controls as in our baseline model. We find that consumer fraud 
victimization is still significantly and negatively related to individuals’ financial 
well-being. The endogeneity test can be rejected (푝 = 0.86) offering support for a 
causal relationship between consumer fraud victimization and financial well-being. 
Nevertheless, although our results suggest causality between consumer fraud vic-
timization and financial well-being, the IV results should be interpreted with cau-
tion due to the nature of survey data, which does not allow us to rule out any 
remaining endogeneity concerns.  
3.1.2. Heterogeneous effects of fraud 
Next, we investigate whether and how the effect of consumer fraud victimization 
on financial well-being varies among subgroups of individuals. Analyzing potential 
differences in the impact of fraud on financial well-being among different subgroups 
                                      
11 The results for the White test 휒2 = 420.73  (푝 < .01) and the Breusch-Pagan test 휒2 = 245.42 (푝 < .01) 
strongly support the assumption of heteroscedasticity in the first-stage regression of fraud victimization. 
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might provide valuable insights on how individuals cope with victimization. To test 
for heterogeneous treatment effects of consumer fraud victimization we separately 
interact our key explanatory variable Fraud with all variables included in regression 
specification (2) of Table V-3. All metric variables are dichotomized via median 
splits and the suffix _high denotes above-median values of observations for these 
variables. We estimate the following linear regression model 
퐹푊퐵푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹푟푎푢푑푖 + 훽2[퐼푛푑푖푐푎푡표푟 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒푖] 
+훽3퐹푟푎푢푑푖  × [퐼푛푑푖푐푎푡표푟 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒푖] + 훾′풄푖 + 휀푖  (2). 
Table V-4 presents the results row-wise by indicator variable. For instance, 훽1 
in the first row reports the effect of Fraud on financial well-being for the subgroup 
of the 50% less financially literate individuals (i.e., Financial literacy_high = 0), 
훽1 + 훽3 denotes the effect of Fraud for the subsample of the 50% more financially 
literate individuals, and 훽3 shows the difference in the effects of Fraud between 
financially illiterate and literate respondents, respectively. Analogously, the seventh 
row reports betas for unadvised individuals (훽1), advised individuals (훽1 + 훽3) and 
the difference between the two groups (훽3). 
Our analysis of treatment-effect heterogeneity provides two major results. First, 
we document that 훽1 and 훽1 + 훽3 remain statistically significant in virtually every 
specification, indicating a homogenous negative effect of fraud on financial well-
being among almost all subgroups. The only exception were fraud does not seem to 
affect financial well-being are unemployed individuals. Second, while the coefficients 
of consumer fraud victimization vary between subgroups, we do not document any 
significant differences except that Fraud seems to have a stronger effect on financial 
well-being of individuals with higher net wealth as captured by the coefficient 훽3. 
This finding might be explained by the circumstance that wealthier individuals 
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possess a higher likelihood of suffering from a fraud victimization involving a con-
siderably larger monetary amount. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the neg-
ative impact of victimization is stronger for wealthy individuals, compared to other 
groups. 
Table V-4: Heterogeneous effects of consumer fraud on financial well-being 
Dependent variable: Financial well-being (FWB) 
  훽1 훽1 + 훽3 훽3 N R2 
Financial literacy_high -3.9880*** -5.2706*** -1.2827 
4,447 0.3696 
 (1.0875) (0.8751) (1.3924) 
Cognitive ability_high -3.9060*** -6.0180*** -2.1120 
4,447 0.3746 
 (1.0150) (0.8757) (1.3337) 
Confidence_high -4.5542*** -5.4674*** -0.9133 
4,447 0.3640 
 (0.8164) (1.4611) (1.6682) 
Trust_high -4.6040*** -4.7149*** -0.1109 
4,447 0.3740 
 (1.0150) (1.0227) (1.4354) 
Emotional stability_high -4.4729*** -5.4666*** -0.9937 
4,447 0.3734 
 (0.8076) (1.4807) (1.6862) 
Risk attitude_high -4.0035*** -5.5690*** -1.5654 
4,447 0.3733 
 (1.0487) (0.9478) (1.4170) 
Investment advice -4.8616*** -3.7781*** 1.0835 
4,447 0.3742 
 (0.8428) (1.1831) (1.4557) 
Female -3.9594*** -5.2452*** -1.2859 
4,447 0.3743 
 (1.1457) (0.9158) (1.4663) 
Age_high -3.9620*** -5.6890*** -1.7270 
4,447 0.3577 
 (1.0279) (1.0248) (1.4444) 
Married -4.2117*** -5.0440*** -0.8323 
4,447 0.3742 
 (1.1101) (0.9345) (1.4459) 
Children -5.0498*** -4.5376*** 0.5122 
4,447 0.3741 
 (1.5074) (0.8212) (1.7153) 
White -5.1233*** -4.4463*** 0.6562 
4,447 0.3735 
 (1.5555) (0.7797) (1.7333) 
Education_high -4.2360*** -5.8862*** -1.6503 
4,447 0.3762 
 (0.8542) (1.2639) (1.5237) 
Work unemployed -4.6749*** -4.5290 0.1459 
4,447 0.3741 
 (0.7279) (3.6322) (3.7030) 
Self-employed -4.6304*** -4.9888* -0.3584 
4,447 0.3741 
 (0.7465) (2.7155) (2.8210) 
Household income_high -3.8460*** -5.5348*** -1.6889 
4,447 0.3733 
 (1.0385) (0.9928) (1.4368) 
Household net wealth_high -3.3641*** -6.4200*** -3.0559** 
4,447  0.3583  
  (1.0106) (1.0369) (1.4508) 
This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from a linear regression model of the generic form: 
퐹푊퐵푖 = 훽0 + 훽1퐹푟푎푢푑푖 + 훽2[퐼푛푑푖푐푎푡표푟 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒푖] + 훽3퐹푟푎푢푑푖  × [퐼푛푑푖푐푎푡표푟 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒푖] + 훾′풄푖 + 휀푖. 
Thus, for the first indicator variable Financial literacy_high, for example, 훽1 reports the effect of being victimized by 
fraud on financial well-being for the group of financially illiterate individuals (i.e., Financial literacy_high = 0). 훽1 + 훽3 
reports the effect of being victimized by fraud on financial well-being for the subsample of financially literate individuals, 
and 훽3 shows the difference in the reported effects between financially illiterate and literate individuals, respectively. All 
metric variables are dichotomized via median splits. The variable suffix _high denotes above-median values of observa-
tions for a given variable. To gauge statistical significance of the estimated coefficients pertaining to (훽1 + 훽3), each 
regression is rerun with rescaled values. The data is weighted and representative for the whole US population. Tailor 
linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p-values of p<.01, p<.05, 
and p<.10, respectively. 
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3.1.3. Consumer fraud victimization types 
Following up on the finding that the negative effect of consumer fraud victimi-
zation on financial well-being is homogenous among the population, we now assess 
whether the negative effect of fraud on financial well-being varies between different 
types of fraud. To reveal potential variation in the effect of the distinct types of 
fraud, namely fraud regarding unsuitable products, misrepresentation of infor-
mation, misusage of money by third parties, and other, we estimate the following 
linear regression model 
퐹푊퐵푖 = 훽0 + 휔′풇푖 + 훾′풄푖 + 휀푖     (3) 
where 풇푖 denotes a vector of the four types of fraud that enters our regression 
model instead of the aggregate measure of consumer fraud victimization, and 풄푖 
shows the vector of control variables. 
 
Table V-5: Consumer fraud victimization types and financial well-being 
Dependent variable: Financial well-being (FWB) 
  (1) (2) 
Fraud types  
Unsuitable products -3.9887* -2.0893 
 (2.2075) (1.3391) 
Misrepresented information -5.9006*** -4.5063*** 
 (1.0054) (0.9629) 
Misusage of money by third parties -8.5344*** -5.7781*** 
 (2.4684) (2.1542) 
Other -2.1752 -4.7080 
 (5.7646) (3.4902) 
Controls No Yes 
N 4,699 4,351 
R2 0.019 0.370 
This table reports coefficient estimates obtained from a linear regression model of the generic form: 
퐹푊퐵푖 = 훽0 + 휔′풇푖 + 훾′풄푖 + 휀푖. 
To analyze the effect of various fraud types, we exclude 105 respondents with multiple fraud types in specification (1) to 
(3). Specification (1) shows the unconditional effects of the vector of various fraud types 풇푖 on respondents’ financial well-
being (FWB), and in specifications (2), we report the conditional effects of fraud types including the vector of control 
variables 풄푖. Reference category are respondents not being victimized by any fraud. The data is weighted and representa-
tive for the whole US population. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate p-values of p<.01, p<.05, and p<.10, respectively. 
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Table V-5 reports coefficient estimates obtained from various specifications of 
Equation (3). In specification (1), we show the unconditional effects of the four 
major fraud types, excluding all control variables. Analogously to our main analysis 
in Table V-3, we further add controls variables in specification (2) of Table V-5, 
respectively. Throughout specification (1) and (2) of Table V-5, we excluded 105 
respondents reporting multiple fraud types, in order to ensure the interpretability 
of the coefficient estimates as well as to isolate the single effects of specific frauds. 
Thus, for example, a coefficient of unsuitable products in Table V-5 can be inter-
preted as the effect of being a victim of fraud regarding unsuitable products, com-
pared to the (omitted) reference group of non-victims, holding all other fraud types 
constant at zero. 
Our results in specification (1) of Table V-5 show that only two out of four 
fraud types seem to affect individuals’ financial well-being. While the effect of fraud 
regarding unsuitable products and other are statistically insignificant (at the 5%-
level), we document that fraud regarding misrepresentation of information and mis-
usage of money by third parties are strongly related to financial well-being. Despite 
the coefficients of fraud regarding misrepresentation of information and misusage 
of money by third parties decreasing in magnitude, the economical relevance and 
statistical significance of both fraud types persists when we add control variables 
(specification (2)). Possible explanations for our findings entail that becoming a 
victim of a fraudulent case involving strongly misrepresented information lets vic-
tims doubt their own abilities to handle financial matters. For instance, victims in 
this case might start blaming themselves for being incapable of understanding im-
portant documents or to judge people providing the fraudulent information. Victims 
begin questioning their own abilities to manage financial transactions, leading to a 
loss in trust in own future financial decision making (Deem, 2000). 
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Likewise, becoming a victim of an embezzlement of investments (or other cases 
of misusage of money by third parties) might shatter victims trust in the financial 
system. Gurun et al. (2018) for instance, observe that fraud cases involving embez-
zlement of investments lead to a widespread loss of trust in financial advisors, re-
sulting in withdrawals of assets. Distrusting financial advice, and thus parts of the 
financial system, can have detrimental impacts on individuals’ financial decision 
making regarding, for example, stock market participation (c.f., Giannetti and 
Wang, 2016), leading to a decrease in financial well-being.  
3.2. Assessing the channels of the effects of consumer fraud on financial well-being 
In this section, we discuss two potential channels through which consumer fraud 
victimization might reduce individuals’ financial well-being. In particular, we aim 
to disentangle whether the effect of consumer fraud victimization on financial well-
being is rather due to changes in subjective evaluation or due to actual (objective) 
changes in individuals’ financial situation. We choose confidence in financial mat-
ters as a potential subjective channel, since various studies provide ample evidence 
for a strong association between self-belief in own financial abilities and financial 
well-being (e.g., Anderson et al., 2017; Bannier and Schwarz, 2018; Farrell et al., 
2016). As an objective channel, we choose total net wealth, a measure that has 
often been used to proxy for individuals’ actual financial well-being (e.g., Brüggen 
et al., 2017; Gerrans et al., 2014; Greninger, 1996). Results in our baseline analysis 
in Table V-3 confirm that both factors are strongly associated with our measure of 
individuals’ financial well-being offering some support that perceived financial well-
being seems to be affected by both subjective and objective channels.12 
  
                                      
12 Please refer to Table V-3 for the effects of confidence and household net wealth on financial well-being, 
respectively. 
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Table V-6: Assessing the channels of the effect of fraud on financial well-being 
Dependent variable: 
Confidence  
Dependent variable: 
Household total net wealth 
 OLS Instrumental variables  OLS Instrumental variables 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Fraud -0.3427** -0.6408**  -35.0400 -21.1037 
 (0.1629) (0.3150)  (70.1644) (65.5065) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 4458 4,458  4,458 4,458 
R2 0.156 0.154  0.061 0.056 
F-statistic first-stage regres-
sion  9.918   8.987 
Endogeneity test (p-value)  0.236   0.411 
In this table, we investigate two channels through which consumer fraud victimization might affect individuals’ financial 
perception of financial well-being. In specification (1) and (2), the dependent variable is individuals’ confidence with 
regard to financial matters, and in column (3) and (4), the dependent variable is household total net wealth (divided by 
$1,000). Specification (1) and (3) report the coefficients from linear regression models and column (2) and (4) provide the 
second stage IV estimates from instrumental variable regressions of confidence and household total net wealth on Fraud 
and all control variables from our baseline specification in column (2) of Table V-3 using generated instruments after 
Lewbel (2012). The data is weighted and representative for the whole US population. Tailor linearized standard errors 
are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p-values of p<.01, p<.05, and p<.10, respectively. 
 
In Table V-6, we regress confidence in financial matters (specification (1) and 
(2)), as well as total net wealth (specification (3) and (4)) on consumer fraud vic-
timization and our set of control variables displayed in Panel A of Table V-1. 
Analogously to our baseline regression in Table V-3, we report both the results from 
linear regression models in specification (1) and (3), as well as the second-stage 
estimates from instrumental variable regressions using generated instruments after 
Lewbel (2012) in specification (2) and (4), respectively. Our results show that while 
consumer fraud victimization is negatively associated with one’s own confidence in 
financial matters (both in OLS and IV models), we do not find evidence in favor of 
an economically meaningful and statistically significant effect on individuals’ net 
wealth. Given that finding, we conclude that becoming a victim of consumer fraud 
deteriorates one’s own financial confidence, resulting in considerable decreases in 
victims’ financial well-being. In that, our results point to the fact that the indirect 
(psychological) costs of consumer fraud victimization, as denoted by a loss in con-
fidence in one’s own financial abilities, seem to outweigh the direct (monetary) costs 
in terms of losses in net wealth. 
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4. Further analyses 
4.1. Controlling for a selection bias of being victimized by consumer fraud 
As a first robustness check, we address potential concerns arising from unequal 
selection probabilities of being victimized by consumer fraud. For instance, studies 
show that fraud is often targeted among the elderly, indicating that they face higher 
probabilities of being victimized by consumer fraud than the younger population 
(e.g., DeLiema et al., 2018; Egan et al., 2018; Reisig and Holtfreter, 2013). To avoid 
a potential selection bias, we perform a propensity score matching analysis by 
matching each consumer fraud victim (treated individual) with non-victims (control 
individuals) based on their propensity score to become a victim of consumer fraud. 
We use a 1:1 nearest-neighbor matching approach including all variables as in our 
main model in column (2) of Table V-3 as control variables. In column (1) of Table 
V-7, we reestimate our main model (column (2) of Table V-3)), and in column (2), 
we reestimate the results of our main model using the matched sample, respectively. 
The coefficient of Fraud in column (2) is still highly statistically and economically 
significant, which allows us to conclude that our results seem to be robust to a 
potential selection bias resulting from distributional differences in observable co-
variates between consumer fraud victims and non-victims. 
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Table V-7: Consumer fraud victimization and financial well-being: 
propensity score matched samples 
Dependent variable: Financial well-being (FWB) 
 Unmatched (main results) Matched sample 
  (1) (2) 
Fraud -4.6650*** -5.5006*** 
 (0.7223) (0.9262) 
Controls Yes Yes 
N 4,447 948 
R2 0.374 0.367 
In this table, we present the results of a propensity score matching analysis, in which we match each consumer fraud 
victim (treated individual) with a non-victim (control group) based on her propensity score to be victimized by consumer 
fraud. For each treated individual, we use a 1:1 nearest-neighbor matching approach and match on all variables used in 
our baseline specification in column (2) of Table V-3. In specification (1), we replicate the results from our baseline model 
in column (2) of Table V-3 (i.e., unmatched sample), and in specification (2), we use the matched sample, respectively. 
The data is weighted and representative for the whole US population. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below 
the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p-values of p<.01, p<.05, and p<.10, respectively. 
 
4.2. Alternative measurement of consumer fraud victimization 
A point of criticism related to our measure of consumer fraud victimization 
might be that our item used to identify consumer fraud victims does not allow us 
to distinguish between consumer frauds actually happened in a legal sense and 
individuals’ subjective feelings about being cheated. Unfortunately, our data at 
hand does not allow us to identify actual fraud cases in a legal sense. However, we 
exploit additional information in our dataset that allows us to measure whether 
victimized individuals reported the consumer fraud and/or submitted a complaint 
to any local, state or federal agency. We restrict our measure of consumer fraud 
victims to those victims who reported and/or submitted a complaint about the 
consumer fraud to any local, state or federal agency, leading to a substantial drop 
of 419 consumer fraud cases that do not meet this restricted criteria.13 While also 
                                      
13 In 2014, 1.5 million fraud-related complaints were actively reported by victims to the Federal Trade 
Commission as reported in their annual Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book (FTC, 2015). Although victims 
could have reported the fraud to different agencies, the discrepancy between the estimated number of annual 
fraud cases of 37.8 million (K. B. Anderson, 2013) (both reported and unreported) based on the FTC Consumer 
Fraud Survey and the 1.5 million actually registered complaints is very large, indicating a vast number of 
unreported fraud cases. Thus, looking at a relatively small fraction of actually reported frauds, we assume that 
once a fraud is reported it is most likely a more severe case that reflects a fraud in a legal sense, therefore 
supporting the rational of our test for robustness. 
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being a self-reported measure, we argue that it is very unlikely that actual consumer 
fraud victims would submit complaints to any agencies when the fraud would not 
have taken place. Thus, we argue that this restricted measure of consumer fraud 
victimization is more likely to reflect actual fraud cases in a legal sense. 
 
Table V-8: Alternative measurement of consumer fraud victimization 
Dependent variable: 
Financial well-being (FWB) 
  (1) (2) 
Fraud -4.6650***  
 (0.7223)  
Fraud reported to local, state or federal agency  -3.1626** 
  (1.2998) 
Controls Yes Yes 
N 4,447 4,069 
R2 0.3741 0.3705 
In this table, we reestimate our main model from column (2) of Table V-3 using an alternative measure for consumer 
fraud victimization. Specification (1) replicates the main results from column (2) of Table V-3. In Specification (2), 
consumer fraud victimization refers to individuals who are victimized by consumer fraud and reported and/or submitted 
a complaint about the fraud to a local, state or federal agency. The data is weighted and representative for the whole US 
population. Tailor linearized standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p-
values of p<.01, p<.05, and p<.10, respectively. 
 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table V-8. Specification (1) replicates 
the results from our baseline analysis in column (2) of Table V-3, and in specifica-
tion (2), we use the restricted measure of consumer fraud victimization. While the 
coefficient of consumer fraud victimization in specification (2) shows an economi-
cally smaller magnitude than in our baseline regression, our findings generally con-
firm that the effect of consumer fraud victimization is still negatively and statisti-
cally significantly related to individuals’ financial well-being. We argue that the 
decrease in economic magnitude can be explained by the fact that victims who 
report their fraud might receive help by the respective agencies. In this context, if 
individuals receive help, they consequently might not feel ‘left alone’, which could 
mitigate the negative effect of victimization on financial well-being. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
How do negative life events affect individuals’ perception of financial well-being? 
In our study, we investigate consumer fraud victimization as a novel determinant 
for individuals’ perception of financial well-being. Perceived financial well-being 
measures individuals’ level of comfort in financial obligations, as well as individuals’ 
perception about having a feeling of financial security. We show that consumer 
fraud victimization has a population-wide and significant negative impact on indi-
viduals’ perception of financial well-being. Our results suggest that the negative 
effect of consumer fraud victimization mainly stems from two consumer fraud vic-
timization types: Fraud in terms of misrepresentation of information as well as 
misusage of money by third parties. Identifying variations in the effects of distinct 
types of fraud on individuals’ financial well-being is a particularly interesting and 
important issue, because governmental resources to support anti-fraud programs 
are constraint. In light of the current funding decisions over the CFPB budget (e.g., 
Friedman, 2018), our results might serve as a guidance for decision makers seeking 
to utilize the available resources in the most efficient way.  
We discuss two potential channels through which consumer fraud victimization 
might reduce individuals’ financial well-being: a loss in confidence in own financial 
abilities and decreases in total net wealth. Our results suggest that victimization 
strongly shatters one’s own confidence to handle financial matters, which is likely 
to translate in lower levels of perceived financial well-being. Since individuals be-
come more and more responsible for their well-being (e.g., Anderson et al., 2017; 
Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer, 2014; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2012; 
Stolper, 2018), especially in terms of decisions regarding retirement provision and 
investments, a loss in one’s own confidence to handle financial matters bears sub-
stantial negative consequences for individuals’ financial decision-making quality. 
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7. Appendix 
Appendix V-1: Variable descriptions 
Name Description UAS survey
Panel A: Control variables 
Age Ordinal variable measuring respondent’s age. General 
Children Dummy = 1 if respondent reports to have children living in household, and zero otherwise. General 
Confidence Ordinal variable measuring respondent’s confidence in the ability to make financial decisions 
on a scale from 0 to 10 (highest confidence). 
UAS 38 
Cognitive  
ability 
Ordinal variable measuring the number of correct answers to 8 cognitive ability (numeracy) 
questions. For the specific wording, please see Weller et al. (2013). 
UAS 1 
Education Ordinal variable that describes the respondent’s highest degree of education: [1] - Higher edu-
cation entrance; [2] - Non-academic post-secondary education; [3] - University degree or higher. 
Zero otherwise. 
General 
Emotional 
stability 
Ordinal variable measuring respondent’s level of emotional stability. Corresponding item "I am 
someone who is emotionally stable, not easily upset" with a corresponding scale ranging from 
[1] - Disagree strongly to [5] - Agree strongly. 
UAS 1 
Female Dummy = 1 if respondent is female, and zero otherwise. General 
Financial 
literacy 
Ordinal variable measuring the number of correct answers to 14 financial literacy questions. 
For the specific wording of the financial literacy questions, we refer to the survey codebook of 
UAS 1 at https://uasdata.usc.edu/index.php. 
UAS 1 
Household  
income 
Continuous variable measuring households’ yearly net income ($US). UAS 24 
Household  
net wealth 
Continuous variable measuring households’ total net wealth ($US). UAS 24 
Investment  
advice 
Dummy = 1 if respondent received investment advice of a professional financial advisor or at-
torney, and zero otherwise. 
UAS 18 
Married Dummy = 1 if respondent is married, and zero otherwise. General 
Race Dummy =1 if respondent’s race is either Asian, Black, White or other, and zero otherwise. General 
Risk attitude Ordinal variable measuring individuals’ risk attitude. Corresponding item "Are you generally a 
person who tries to avoid taking risks or one who is fully prepared to take risks?" with a corre-
sponding scale ranging from [0] - Not at all willing to take risks [10] - Very willing to take 
risks. 
UAS 20 
Self-employed Dummy =1 if respondent is self-employed, and zero otherwise. UAS 38 
Trust Ordinal variable measuring respondent’s general trust level. Corresponding item "I am some-
one who is generally trusting" with a corresponding scale ranging from [1] - Disagree strongly 
to [5] - Agree strongly. 
UAS 1 
Unemployed Dummy = 1 if respondent is unemployed, and zero otherwise. UAS 38 
Panel B: Consumer fraud victimization measures and consumer fraud types 
Fraud Dummy =1 if respondent answered "yes" to the following item: "Do you feel like you have been 
taken advantage of on a major financial transaction in the last 3 years? Major means at least 
$1,000", and zero otherwise. 
UAS 18 
Fraud reported 
to local, state or 
federal agency 
Dummy =1 if respondent answered "yes" to the following item: "Do you feel like you have been 
taken advantage of on a major financial transaction in the last 3 years? Major means at least 
$1,000", and reported and/or submitted a complaint about the fraud to any local, state or fed-
eral agency, and zero otherwise. 
UAS 18 
Unsuitable 
products 
Dummy = if respondent reports being a victim of fraud regarding unsuitable products (e.g., 
(additional) products sold there were needed), and zero otherwise. 
UAS 18 
Misrepresenta-
tion of infor-
mation 
Dummy = if respondent reports being a victim of fraud regarding misrepresentation of infor-
mation (i.e., undisclosed fees, higher price than named, less product or service received than 
expected and unclear terms of transaction), and zero otherwise. 
UAS 18 
Misusage of 
money by third 
parties 
Dummy = if respondent reports being a victim of fraud regarding misusage of money by third 
parties (e.g., embezzlement of investments by third parties, such as investment advisors), and 
zero otherwise. 
UAS 18 
Other Dummy = if respondent reports being a victim of other fraud, and zero otherwise. UAS 18 
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Appendix V-2: Financial well-being scale: item summary statistics 
 % of US population  Item information 
Panel A: This statement describes me 
Com-
pletely Very well Somewhat 
Very lit-
tle 
Not at 
all  Reverse coded 
I could handle a major financial transaction. 10.01% 19.70% 35.02% 18.62% 16.66%  No 
I am securing my financial future. 9.31% 23.08% 38.24% 19.57% 9.80%  No 
Because of my money situation, I feel like I will never have the things 
in want in life. 7.66% 10.93% 34.38% 30.45% 16.57%  Yes 
I can enjoy life because of the way I’m management my money. 8.36% 24.73% 40.28% 19.38% 7.25%  No 
I am just getting by financially. 11.71% 14.29% 35.22% 21.69% 17.09%  Yes 
I am concerned that the money I have or will won’t last. 15.88% 15.74% 37.97% 20.48% 9.93%  Yes 
Panel B: This statement applies to me Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never   
Giving a gift for a wedding, birthday or other occasion would put a 
strain on my finances for the month. 6.56% 9.96% 29.67% 34.02% 19.78%  Yes 
I have money left over at the end of the month. 18.07% 22.89% 30.99% 18.38% 9.68%  No 
I am behind with my finances. 5.58% 8.32% 21.44% 30.63% 34.03%  Yes 
My finances control my life. 8.83% 13.92% 31.63% 27.79% 17.83%   Yes 
This table reports summary statistics on the items sued to build the financial well-being scale. Please note that for the reverse code items in Panel A and B, the cate-
gories “Not at all” and “Never” receive the highest value of four. The data is weighted and representative for the whole US population. 
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Appendix V-3: Data cleansing procedure for consumer fraud item 
We conduct some data cleansing steps to reduce potential measurement error 
in the variable Fraud. In this context, we exploit the information provided in the 
free-text response to other types of fraud in two ways. First, we assess whether the 
answer given in the free-text response matches a common definition of consumer 
fraud victimization. We follow the most common definition and define consumer 
fraud victimization as “intentional deception or attempted deception of a victim 
with the promise of goods, services, or other benefits that are nonexistent, unnec-
essary, were never intended to be provided, or were grossly misrepresented” (Titus, 
2001, p. 57). We identify 112 observations that may not be classified as being vic-
timized by consumer fraud and drop them from our analysis. In a second step, we 
assess whether the fraud type mentioned in the free-text variable for the remaining 
observations can be attributed to any of the other three fraud categories (e.g., 
misrepresentation of information). In doing so, we reclassify one respondent from 
other to unsuitable products, 29 respondents from other to misrepresented infor-
mation and nine respondents from other to misusage of money by third parties, 
respectively. Detailed descriptions on the free-text variable capturing other fraud 
reasons and their mapping to other categories are available upon request. Please 
note that our results do not change materially when we do not reclassify the re-
spondents. The results are available upon request. 
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Affidavit 
 
Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorgelegten und nachfolgend aufgelisteten Aufsätze 
selbstständig und nur mit den Hilfen angefertigt habe, die im jeweiligen Aufsatz 
angegeben oder zusätzlich in der nachfolgenden Liste aufgeführt sind. In der Zu-
sammenarbeit mit den angeführten Koautoren war ich mindestens anteilig beteiligt. 
Bei den von mir durchgeführten und in den Aufsätzen erwähnten Untersuchungen 
habe ich die Grundsätze guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis, wie sie in der Satzung der 
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen zur Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis nie-
dergelegt sind, eingehalten. 
 
 
     
Tobias Meyll 
Bruchköbel, den 29.05.2019 
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